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The first essay examines how the outcome of prior repurchasing activity influences 
future repurchasing decisions. We find strong evidence that future decisions to 
repurchase equity are negatively influenced by poorly timed past repurchases. 
Specifically, we show that the past losses on stock repurchases reduce the propensity to 
engage in additional repurchases in the future. We find almost no evidence that past gains 
on repurchases positively or negatively influence future repurchasing activity. These 
results are robust to various firm characteristics, estimation and sampling methods. 
Further analyses show that losses on past repurchases influence dividend policy. We 
show that the dividend-repurchase substitution rate slows down for firms that experience 
losses in their past repurchase activities. Overall, results suggest that managerial 
behavioral biases have a strong influence on future repurchase decisions consistent with 
the loss-aversion concept of prospect theory. 
The second essay examines the relation between insider (officers and directors) open 
market transactions and the outcome of past insider trading to better understand what 
motivates insiders to trade. We find strong evidence that open market purchases made by 
insiders are negatively influenced by poorly timed insider purchases. Specifically, we 
show that the losses on insider purchases reduce the intensity of open market purchases. 
We find almost no evidence that past gains from insider trading positively or negatively 
  
 
 
influence open market purchases. These results are robust to various firm characteristics, 
estimation and sampling methods. The results suggest that managerial behavioral biases 
have a strong influence on future insider purchasing activity consistent with the loss-
aversion concept of prospect theory. Further analyses show that loss aversion can 
enhance insider wealth by helping insiders avoid a loss of 5.7% over the course of the 
next year under certain circumstances while refraining from loss aversion under certain 
circumstances can help insiders to net an average of 8.14% over the following year. 
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Essay 1 
Does Past Performance of Stock Repurchases Affect Future Repurchase Decisions? 
 
1. Introduction 
Stock repurchases are risky investments made by management on behalf of 
current shareholders. There is an extensive literature which documents “rational” 
motivations for managers repurchasing their firm’s stock. By rational we simply mean 
stock repurchases are used as a tool that benefits the firm’s shareholders in some way by 
increasing, or at least holding constant, firm value. DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner 
(2008) provide anecdotal evidence of firms repurchasing their stocks at high prices prior 
to the 2008 financial crisis.  They question managers’ ability to time the market and ask 
whether repurchasing activity will ever return to pre-2008 levels.  
At odds with this notion of rationality is the recent empirical work of Bonaime et 
al. (2012) who find that, on average, managers exhibit a propensity to mis-time stock 
repurchases and in the process destroy significant amounts of shareholder wealth.  Their 
empirical findings suggest the possibility of additional behavioral factors that may 
influence repurchase activity.  In particular, Bonaime et al. (2012) document a tendency 
of managers to repurchase more after their stock has gone up, and less after their firm’s 
stock price has fallen, which leads to lower returns, on average.  This finding suggests 
that managerial repurchase decisions may be influenced by prior stock returns, and may 
actually destroy shareholder value. The results of Bonaime et al. (2012) follow a line of 
research suggesting investment decisions may be influenced by past returns1. 
                                                           
1
 Ippolito (1992) shows inflows to mutual funds are strongly correlated with past fund performance.   
Empirical work by Dichev (2007), Friesen and Sapp (2007) and Frazzini and Lamont (2008) indicates that 
poor investment-timing decisions, in which investors buy after past gains and sell after past losses, destroys 
investor wealth 
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We hypothesize that managerial stock repurchases are also influenced by the rate 
of return on the existing portfolio of repurchased stock generated from prior gains and 
losses from stock repurchases.  This is consistent with research demonstrating that in a 
variety of contexts, decisions under uncertainty can be substantially affected by the 
outcomes of past decisions (see for example, Thaler 1980; Staw 1981; Arkes and Blumer 
1985).  Thaler and Johnson (1990) investigate how prior gains and losses affect risk 
taking behavior.  Based on experimental data from Cornell undergraduate and MBA 
students they find increased willingness to take risk after prior gains, which they refer to 
as the “house money effect”.   However, after experiencing a prior loss, individuals 
showed increased loss aversion and reduced willingness to take risk.  
If past gains and losses influence repurchase decisions, then only including recent 
stock returns in one’s model may fail to capture this effect.  This is because repurchases 
are not made smoothly, and thus the gains and losses on the portfolio are affected by past 
returns, as well as the timing of the cash flows used to purchase stock. Thus, we begin 
our empirical work by calculating firm-level gains and losses on repurchased stock, and 
examining the impact of past repurchase returns on the decision to repurchase new 
shares.  In this empirical work, we examine gains and losses separately to allow for the 
possibility of an asymmetric response, which might obtain if managers exhibit loss 
aversion (Johnson and Thaler, 1990). We find evidence of loss aversion; specifically that 
firms are unlikely to repurchase stocks when they lose money from past stock 
repurchases; and almost no evidence that past gains on repurchases influence future 
repurchasing activity even after controlling for variables previously shown to affect 
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repurchase activity (e.g. cash, cash flow, book-to-market ratio, firm size, past one-quarter 
return, etc.). 
To control for the possibility that our results are not actually due to managerial 
biases or loss aversion, but due to some unobservable firm-level feature, we examine 
cross-sectional variation in the results as a function of two CEO-level characteristics: 
tenure and age. We find that managers’ decreased propensity to conduct stock 
repurchases given losses from prior stock repurchases (loss aversion) is more pronounced 
in firms whose CEOs have shorter tenure.  
We also provide some evidence suggesting that given losses from prior stock 
repurchasing activity further increases in losses are associated with lower levels of 
spending on stock repurchases and no evidence that additional gains have any effect on 
the level of spending on stock repurchases. 
Finally, we show that the “loss-aversion” effect on repurchases indirectly affects 
dividend payouts. Specifically, the dividend-repurchase substitution rate slows down for 
firms that experience losses in their past repurchase activities. 
The findings in this study contribute to the literature in several ways. First, while 
Bonaime et al. (2012) provide evidence of managers unsuccessfully timing the markets, 
we show that the outcome of prior stock repurchases influences current repurchasing, and 
that managers respond differently to past gains and losses. In addition to managers’ 
documented inability to time the markets, the “bad timing” subsequently decreases their 
propensity to conduct stock repurchases. Second, we present evidence of the substitution 
hypothesis between dividends and stocks repurchases, and show that the substitution rate 
is influenced by gains and losses on past repurchases. Finally, this study is the first study 
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to document a link between loss aversion and stock repurchases, and compliments 
existing work of Ben-David et al. (2007) and Baker and Wurgler (2012) which suggests 
overconfidence and optimism as behavioral determinants of stock repurchases. It also 
compliments Baker and Wurgler (2011) which relates prospect theory to payout policy by 
modeling dividends in a framework in which investors are loss averse to reductions in 
dividends.   
The study proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature on stock 
repurchases and develops the hypothesis. Section 3 describes the data used in the study. 
Section 4 presents the tests of our main hypothesis while section 5 provides the 
implications prior losses and gains from stock repurchased have on dividend policy. 
Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Literature Review and Motivation 
2.1 Determinants of Stock Repurchases 
This section provides a brief overview of the literature on the determinants of 
stock repurchases, which we organize into the following broad categories:  firm cash 
flow, undervaluation, firm leverage, managerial stockholdings and corporate control. 
2.1.1 Firm Cash Flow 
Like dividends, repurchases can be used to alleviate agency problems associated 
with excess cash flow. The noncommittal nature of stock repurchases, particularly open 
market repurchases (the most popular type), gives repurchases an advantage over 
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dividends. Most papers hypothesize that high levels of excess cash or cash flow are 
positively related to both the decision to repurchase and the level of stock repurchases. 
Dittmar (2000) conducts tobit regressions by years and finds a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between cash, and the level of stock repurchases and between 
cash flow and the level of stock repurchases holding investment opportunities constant. 
Lie (2000) finds that in years prior to the announcement of tender offers firms tend to 
have higher levels of undistributed cash flows compared to their industry medians. 
Babenko et al (2011) find cash and cash flows are positively and significantly related to 
completion rates and the level of open market share repurchases. Finally Bonaime et al 
(2012) find that firms with higher levels of cash and cash flows are more likely to 
repurchase stocks. 
Lie (2000) finds that dividend increases are used to disgorge permanent increases 
in cash flows while special dividends and tender offers are used to disgorge temporary 
increases. The paper also finds positive stock market reactions to the announcements of 
tender offers and special dividends and presents this as evidence that tender offers and 
special dividends can be used to mitigate the free cash flow problem (contrary to the 
signaling hypothesis according to which disbursements signal positive information about 
a firm’s future cash flows). Grullon and Michaely (2002) show that firms finance 
repurchases with funds (cash) that otherwise would have been used to increase dividends, 
which supports the “substitution hypothesis”. 
2.1.2.   Firm undervaluation 
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Dittmar (2000) suggests firms repurchase equity to correct and even signal 
undervaluation by timing the market.  According to this motive, managers would 
repurchase the firm’s stock when they believe the stock is undervalued. Such actions can 
be viewed by the market as a signal or as an investment and are followed by positive 
market reactions. According to this hypothesis increases in stock prices following the 
announcement of a repurchase program is due to information revealed by the 
announcement (Stephens and Weisbach, 1998). 
One group of studies uses insider trading as a proxy for firm undervaluation.  For 
example, Dann (1981) and Vermaelen (1981) examine market reactions to repurchase 
announcements and find that managers essentially waive their rights to sell shares in 
repurchase tender offers. This suggests managers announce tender offers when they 
believe the firm’s stock is undervalued. Vermaelen (1981) holds that firms use stock 
repurchases to signal either that the firm has no positive NPV projects and has to pay out 
free cash flows (this would be consistent with the excess cash flow hypothesis discussed 
earlier) or that the firm is undervalued.   
Instead of using market reaction to infer market timing, D’Mello and Shroff 
(2000) test the timing hypothesis directly by estimating a perfect foresight economic 
value (intrinsic value) of the firm and compare it to current market prices. They find that 
74% of the firms in their sample conduct fixed-price tender repurchase offers when the 
market price is below the firm’s intrinsic value. They also find that insiders of 
undervalued firms are net buyers while those of overvalued firms are net sellers.  This 
result is consistent with Lee et al (1992) who find that managers adjust their personal 
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trading behavior prior to tender offer repurchases as though they had private information 
about their firm that is conveyed by the repurchase. 
Babenko et al (2011) hypothesize and find that executives who buy back shares 
before an announcement add credibility to the undervaluation signal. Specifically they 
find that insiders of announcing firms purchase significantly more stock one and two 
years prior to the repurchase announcement than insiders of matching firms, especially 
when information asymmetry between insiders and investors is large. They test and find 
that program completion rates of such programs increase with insider purchases. 
Bonaime and Ryngaert (2011) examine whether firms and insiders trade in the same 
direction and find that insider trading at repurchasing firms is not always consistent with 
undervaluation. They find that insider buying and selling are more frequent in quarters 
when firms are repurchasing non-trivial amounts of stock. A puzzling result from this 
paper is that share repurchases are most frequent when insiders are net sellers. One 
explanation of this is that firm insiders generally trade in a contrarian manner. Thus 
repurchasing firms with net insider buying in the same quarter are more likely to be 
undervalued (earn positive abnormal returns after repurchases) than firms with net insider 
selling in that quarter. 
Other proxies for firm undervaluation include asset size and past stock returns.  
Varmaelen (1981) holds that information asymmetry may be more pronounced in small 
firms because they are less covered by analysts and the popular press, and finds that 
smaller firms tend to have larger announcement returns.  Dittmar (2000) hypothesizes a 
negative relationship between the natural log of assets and the level of repurchases but 
finds the opposite. On the other hand, Babenko et al (2011) find a negative and 
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significant effect on buy and hold announcements returns and a positive and significant 
effect on actual repurchases.  Stephens and Weisbach (1998) hypothesize and find a 
negative relationship between stock performance and the level of repurchases and 
Bonaime et al (2012) find a negative relationship between a firm’s returns in the prior 
quarter and the likelihood of repurchasing. 
Another proxy for undervaluation is the market-to-book ratio (although it can also 
be used to control for a firm’s investment opportunities2). Dittmar (2000) holds that while 
historical returns are a backward-looking measure of valuation and may not detect current 
misvaluation, a firm’s market-to-book ratio may indicate a firm’s potential for 
undervaluation. Thus Dittmar (2000) hypothesizes and finds a negative relationship 
between the market-to-book ratio and the level of stock repurchases, thus indicating 
managers may be using stock repurchases to take advantage of undervaluation.  In 
contrast, Bonaime et al (2012) find a positive relationship between book-to-market and 
the likelihood of repurchasing and presents this as evidence that firms time the market 
badly.3 
2.1.3.  Firm Leverage 
Stock repurchases increase firms’ leverage ratios, ceteris paribus. To the extent 
that firms have an optimal capital structure, firms may use stock repurchase to achieve 
their target. Dittmar (2000) hypothesizes and finds lower optimal leverage ratios for 
repurchasing firms compared with non-repurchasing firms. Specifically if a firm’s net 
leverage ratio is lower than its target, then it may repurchase to increase leverage.  
                                                           
2
 Babenko et al (2011) use the market-to-book ratio as a proxy for Tobin’s Q  
3
 Based on the November 2011 draft 
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Baker and Wurgler (2002) offer a theory in which capital structure is the 
cumulative outcome of past attempts to time equity markets. The main finding of their 
study is that low (high) leverage firms raise funds when their market values (M/B) are 
high (low). In other words, low leverage firms repurchase stocks when their market 
values were low. Consistent with this, Bonaime et al (2012) find a negative relationship 
between leverage (total liabilities scaled by assets) and the decision to repurchase. 
2.1.4.  Other Cited Determinants of Repurchases 
Since the shares provided to managers when they exercise their stock options 
come from treasury stock, preserving the stock value may be a motive for stock 
repurchases when management holds stock options. Dittmar (2000) finds a positive 
relationship between outstanding stock options and repurchasing activity.  A potential 
target can use repurchases to increase acquisition costs hence stock repurchases can be 
used as a takeover defense.  Stock repurchases increase acquisition costs because the 
selling shareholders are those with the lowest reservation price. Thus by repurchasing, a 
firm can increase the lowest price for which a stock is available (Dittmar, 2000). 
2.2. The Effect of Past Gains & Losses on Risk-Taking Behavior 
The extensive literature discussed above captures what we will label “rational” 
motivations for repurchasing the firm’s stock.  By rational we simply mean that in each 
of the cited papers, repurchasing is used as a tool that benefits the firm’s shareholders in 
some way by increasing, or at least holding constant, firm value.  At odds with this notion 
of rationality is the recent empirical work of Bonaime et al. (2012) who find that, on 
average, managers exhibit a propensity to mis-time stock repurchases and in the process 
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destroy significant amounts shareholder wealth.  Their empirical findings suggest the 
possibility of additional behavioral factors that may influence repurchase activity.  In 
particular, Bonaime et al. (2012) document a tendency of managers to repurchase more 
after their stock has gone up, and less after their firm’s stock price has fallen, which leads 
to lower returns, on average.  This finding suggests that managerial repurchase decisions 
may be influenced by prior stock returns, and may actually destroy shareholder value. 
The results of Bonaime et al. (2012) follow a line of research suggesting 
investment decisions may be influenced by past returns.  For instance, Ippolito (1992) 
shows inflows to mutual funds are strongly correlated with past fund performance.   
Empirical work by Friesen and Sapp (2007), Frazzini and Lamont (2008) and Dichev 
(2007) indicates that poor investment-timing decisions, in which investors buy after past 
gains and sell after past losses, destroy a significant percentage of investor wealth.  
We hypothesize that in addition to being influenced by recent returns, managerial 
repurchases may also be influenced by gains and losses on the existing portfolio of 
repurchased stock.  This is consistent with research demonstrating that in a variety of 
contexts decisions under uncertainty can be substantially affected by the outcomes of past 
decisions (see for example, Thaler 1980; Staw 1981; Arkes and Blumer 1985).  Thaler 
and Johnson (1990) investigate how prior gains and losses affect risk taking behavior and 
find based on experimental data from Cornell undergraduate and MBA students an 
increased willingness to take risk after prior gains, which they refer to as the “house 
money effect”.   However, after experiencing a prior loss, individuals showed increased 
loss aversion, a phenomenon sometimes referred to as the “snakebite effect”.  Their 
results suggest that losses are more painful if they happen after prior losses and less 
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painful if they occur after prior gains, since prior gains act as cushions for future losses.  
Frino, Grant and Johnstone (2007) examine Australian futures traders and find supporting 
evidence, that traders take on more risk in the afternoon on days with morning gains.  
Low (2004) finds that prior losses are associated with increased loss aversion, which is 
consistent with the snakebite effect.   However, the evidence on the effect of past gains 
and losses is mixed.  Coval and Shumway (2005) find that traders with morning losses 
increase risk-taking in the afternoon. 
Regardless of the precise nature of the relationship, if past gains and losses 
influence repurchase decisions, then including only recent stock returns in one’s model 
may fail to capture this effect.  This is because repurchases are not made smoothly, and 
thus the gains and losses on the portfolio are affected both by past returns, and the timing 
of the cash flows used to purchase stock. We begin our empirical work by calculating at 
the firm-level gains and losses on repurchased stock, and examining the impact of past 
repurchase returns on the decision to repurchase new shares and the amount of shares 
repurchased.  In this empirical work, we examine gains and losses separately to allow for 
the possibility of an asymmetric response, which might obtain if CEOs exhibit loss 
aversion (Johnson and Thaler, 1990). 
To control for the possibility that our results are not actually due to managerial 
biases or loss aversion, but to some unobservable firm-level feature, we examine cross-
sectional variation in the results as a function of two CEO-level characteristics: tenure 
and age.  Prendergast and Stole (1996) present a model in which individuals want to 
acquire a reputation for quickly learning a correct course of action.  This desire leads to 
two types of sub-optimal behavior:  exaggeration, in which individuals respond too much 
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to new information; and conservatism, in which behavior is not changed enough in the 
light of new information.  In their model, individuals early in their job tenure tend to 
respond too much, while those with longer tenure respond too little.   Drawing upon these 
results, we hypothesize that CEOs with the shortest tenure will exhibit behavior that is 
most sensitive to realized gains and losses, while long-tenure CEOs will be the least 
sensitive.    
With respect to the link between age and loss aversion, Johnson et al. (2006) find 
an increasing relationship between risk aversion and age, while Hjorth and Fosgerau 
(2009) find that loss aversion increases with age up to around 55 years, and then declines 
rapidly. Because the majority of CEOs in the sample are in the 50 to 57 years age range, 
it is unclear whether one should expect a linear relationship between loss aversion and 
age. 
Finally, to the extent that prior gains and losses from stock repurchases affect 
future repurchasing activity we test if the gains and losses have any effect on other 
corporate activities specifically, dividend policy and cash holdings of firms . With respect 
to dividend, can the outcome of past stock repurchases provide evidence consistent with 
the dividend substitution hypothesis documented by Grullon and Michaelly (2002)? We 
hypothesize that to the extent dividends and stock repurchases are substitutes, the 
substitution of stock repurchases for dividends will be weaker (stronger) for firms that 
repurchase their stock and have prior losses (gains).   
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3. Data and Sample Construction 
We begin with US firms in COMPUSTAT and CRSP.  The sample spans the 
period 1984-2011. A firm enters the sample the first quarter it repurchases at least 0.1 
percent of its shares outstanding and remains in the sample until it either delists or until 
the end of 2011. We also limit the sample to nonfinancial and nonutility firms by 
dropping firms with SIC codes 6000 to 6999 and 4900 to 4999 and require firms to have 
CRSP share codes 10 and 11. This results in 232,308 firm-quarter observations and 6460 
firms. 
Following Banyi, Dyl, and Kahle (2008), we compute the dollars spent on stock 
repurchases as COMPUSTAT’s quarterly purchase of common and preferred stock from 
the cash flow statement (PRSTKCY, adjusted for the fact that this variable is year to 
date) minus any decreases in reported balance sheet preferred stock (PSTKQ). Then 
following Bonaime (2012), we express the dollars spent on stock repurchases as a 
percentage of the firm’s market capitalization in the prior quarter. A firm first enters the 
sample the first quarter this variable is at least 0.1 percent. Later we transform this 
variable into a binary variable which equals 1 if the condition is met else zero as the 
dependent variable in logit regressions. 
The primary goal of this paper is to test if the returns from prior stock repurchases 
(REPO_RET) have any effect on future repurchasing activity and if yes, are managers 
more sensitive to prior losses than they are to prior gains. The main variable, REPO_RET 
is constructed as follows: 
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• Step 1: Following Banyi, Dyl, and Kahle (2008)  we compute the quarterly 
cost of stock repurchases as COMPUSTAT’s quarterly purchase of common 
and preferred stock from the cash flow statement (PRSTKCY, adjusted for the 
fact that this variable is year to date) minus any decreases in reported balance 
sheet preferred stock (PSTKQ). 
•  Step 2: Following Banyi, Dyl, and Kahle (2008)  we estimate the numbers of 
shares repurchased in a given quarter by dividing the quarterly cost of stock 
repurchases (from step one) by the stock repurchase price which is the average 
closing stock prices for each month in a given quarter. 
• Step 3: For each quarter, we cumulate the number of shares repurchased by 
each firm starting from the quarter the firm first enters the sample to the end 
of the current quarter while adjusting for stock splits. Then we multiply this 
by the closing stock price of the quarter to get the cumulative market value of 
shares repurchased. Conversely, we compute the associated cumulative cost of 
stock repurchases by cumulating the quarterly cost of stock repurchases from 
step 1.   
• Step 4: Finally, to get the returns of repurchased stocks (REPO_RET), we 
subtract the cumulative cost of stock repurchases from the cumulative market 
value of stock repurchases and scale it by the end of quarter book value of 
assets. The rational for scaling by the book value of assets instead of the 
cumulative cost of stock repurchases is emphasize the role of the economic 
significance of prior gains and losses on future stock repurchasing activity. 
Two firms with identical dollar losses and cumulative costs of stock 
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repurchases but of different firm sizes may react differently. For example they 
may both have a loss of $1million dollars and a cumulative cost of $2 million 
resulting in a return of -50% each but if one has a firm size of $1 billion and 
the other $100 million the REPO_RET  will be -0.001 and -0.01 respectively 
and hence both firms will feel the losses differently. 
Table 1 presents an example of the calculation of repurchase portfolio returns 
(REPO_RET) of a firm over four years (16 quarters) assuming no stock splits. Thus 
REPO_RET is the cumulative return from stock repurchases from the first time a firm 
first repurchases 0.1% of its market capitalization.  
The analysis and the variables in this study are based on 3 samples. The main 
sample is based on COMPUSTAT; a second sample which requires tenure and age data 
from EXECUCOMP; and a third sample which is used to test the dividend substitution 
hypothesis. Table 2 provides summary statistics for the variables used in the study.  
Table 3 provides annual statistics on repurchasing activity and dollar gains from 
repurchases from 1984 to 2011. Table 3 starts by providing annual stock repurchase 
initiations (the number of firms that repurchase at least 0.1 percent of the previous 
quarter’s market capitalization for the first time). Next the table 3 reports the total 
number of repurchasing firms in any given year. This is followed by the aggregate dollars 
spent on stock repurchases and the aggregate dollar gains from repurchases respectively 
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both in nominal and real terms4. The last two columns report the average dollars spent on 
repurchases and the average dollar gains from repurchases. 
The main finding from table 3 is that repurchasing activity and the dollar gains 
tend to slow down at the onset of recessions. For example if we look at the last recession 
although the number of firms initiating stock repurchases and the number of firms 
conducting stock repurchases were still substantial, the dollars spent on repurchases went 
from $560.189 million to $168,056 million in 2007 compared to 2009, representing a 
70% decrease. The most popular reason for the slowdown in repurchasing activity 
provided in the media is related to firms stock piling cash for precautionary reasons due 
to the uncertain macroeconomic environment. Likewise, the aggregate dollar gains from 
repurchases went from a peak of $7,515,406 million in 2007 to $2,285,522 million in 
2009 which also corresponds to a 70% decrease. Could this decrease in gains from prior 
stock repurchases also explain the decrease in repurchasing activity? 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
In this section we examine the impact of past repurchase returns on the decision to 
repurchase new shares. In our empirical framework, we examine gains and losses 
separately to allow for the possibility of an asymmetric response, which might obtain if 
CEOs exhibit loss aversion. we start our analysis by computing the cumulative stock 
repurchase returns from the first time a firm repurchases its shares in our sample until the 
third quarter of 2011 or until a firm delists. Next we compute the stock repurchase returns 
                                                           
4
 The real values are in 2011 dollars using GDP deflator from FRED. The base year from FRED is 2005 but 
to use 2011 as the base year we divide the deflator series by the 2011 value.  
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using different horizons (three year rolling windows, 5 year rolling windows, and 10 year 
rolling windows). To control for the possibility that our results are not actually due to 
managerial biases or loss aversion, but to some unobservable firm-level feature, we 
examine cross-sectional variation in our results as a function of two CEO-level 
characteristics: tenure and age and measure the cumulative stock repurchase returns over 
CEO tenure in the third sub-section. Finally, we examine the relationship between prior 
gains and losses from past repurchasing activity and the level of repurchases. 
4.1 The impact of past repurchase returns on the decision to repurchase new shares 
In this sub-section we use multivariate fixed effects logit estimators first to test 
whether the probability that a firm repurchases its stock depends systematically on past 
stock repurchase returns (equation 1 below). Secondly, we examine gains and losses 
separately to allow for the possibility of an asymmetric response, which might obtain if 
managers exhibit loss aversion in other words we test whether managers are more 
sensitive to prior negative stock repurchase returns than they are to prior positive stock 
repurchase returns (equation 2 below). The dependent variable, REPODUMt equals to 
one in quarters where the firm repurchases at least 0.1 percent of its market capitalization. 
We estimate the following multivariate fixed effects logit models:  
  1|	 ,          
   !"#  $%_  
'()*++(,-                                                                                               eq.1 
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In both equations, i represents the firm, t represents time measured at the end of a 
given quarter, and ci is an unobserved time invariant firm fix effect. We control for prior 
determinants of stock repurchases found in the literature as follows: 
To control for the agency hypothesis the following proxy variables are used: 
• CASHt-1: CHEQ/ ATQ: Cash and short-term investments (this represents cash 
and all securities readily transferable to cash as listed in the Current Asset 
section of the firm’s balance sheet) scaled by total assets and lagged by one 
quarter.  
• CF
 t-1: OIBDPQ/ATQ: Operating income before depreciation scaled by total 
assets, and lagged by one quarter. 
Consistent with prior research that uses excess cash flows as a motive for share 
repurchases to alleviate agency problems, we predict high levels of excess cash and cash 
flows are positively related to the decision to repurchase shares, ceteris paribus. 
To control for undervaluation, we use the following proxy variables: 
• SIZE
 t-1: LN (ATQ): is the natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets lagged by 
one quarter. Consistent with prior research we expect a positive relationship 
between size and the decision to repurchase stock. Especially because bigger 
firms are more likely to have the cash to repurchase stocks. 
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• RETt-1: Quarterly stock return is the cumulative discrete quarter stock return 
based on the monthly returns from CRSP; lagged by one quarter. Consistent 
with prior research (for example Stephens and Weisbach 1998), if firms 
repurchase stocks to take advantage of or to signal undervaluation then we 
expect a negative relationship between stock performance and the decision to 
repurchase. 
• BM
 t-1: book-to-market ratio computed as CEQQ/marketCap, lagged by one 
quarter, where CEQQ is total Common or Ordinary Equity. This can also be 
used to control for a firm’s investment opportunities. Dittmar (2000) holds 
while historical returns are a backward-looking measure of valuation and may 
not detect current misvaluation, a firm’s book-to-market ratio may indicate a 
firm’s potential for undervaluation.  Thus we expect a positive relationship 
between book-to-market ratio and the decision to repurchase as firms take 
advantage of undervaluation.  
To control for the optimal leverage hypothesis we use: 
• Lev t-1: LTQ/ATQ: Total liabilities scaled by total assets. Stock repurchases 
reduce equity which increases the firm’s leverage ratio, ceteris paribus. To the 
extent that firms have an optimal capital structure, firms may use stock 
repurchases to achieve their target capital structure (Dittmar 2000). Thus we 
expect a negative relationship between leverage and the decision to 
repurchase. 
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We use equation one to test whether the probability that a firm repurchases its 
stock depends systematically on past stock repurchase returns. In equation one the 
variable of interest is REPO_RETt-1 which is the cumulative value of all stocks a firm has 
repurchased minus the dollars spent on those repurchases scaled by the end of quarter 
value of total assets and lagged one quarter. 
 We also test for managerial loss aversion in the second equation by augmenting 
the first equation with two variables: (1) LOSSt-1: an indicator which equals one if 
REPO_RETt-1 is negative and zero if positive; and (2) an interaction variable 
REPO_RETt-1 x LOSSt-1. If firms are more sensitive to prior losses than prior gains when 
deciding to repurchase stocks then, the coefficient on REPO_RETt-1 x LOSSt-1, β9 will be 
positive and significant5. 
Also all explanatory variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile and 
year effects are included to help control for the effect of the business cycle on stock 
repurchases among other factors. 
Table 4 presents the results from the logit regressions. Model 1 uses determinants 
found in prior literature. Model 2 tests whether past stock repurchases returns affect the 
probability that a firm repurchasing its stock while excluding prior determinants. Model 3 
augments model 2 with the REPO_RETt-1 x LOSSt-1 interaction variable to test for 
managerial loss aversion. Model 4 tests whether stock repurchase returns affect the 
                                                           
5 The regression model presented in equation 2 is piecewise since holding all other variables constant, the 
coefficient on REPO_RETt-1 captures the slope in the region of positive stock repurchase returns (gains) 
while the coefficient on the interaction term REPO_RETt-1 x LOSSt-1 plus that of REPO_RETt-1  is the slope 
in the region of prior negative stock repurchase returns (losses). Hence the coefficient on REPO_RETt-1 x 
LOSSt-1 is a kink at the origin and if positive results in a steeper slope in the domain of losses. However, the 
coefficient on LOSSt-1 captures a discontinuity at the origin or kink. we do not provide an economic 
interpretation of that parameter.  
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probability of stock repurchases while controlling for other determinants by combining 
models 1 and 2. Model 5, the main model tests whether the probability of repurchasing is 
more sensitive to negative stock repurchase returns (losses) compared with past positive 
stock repurchase returns (gains) while controlling for other determinant by combining 
models 1 and 3. Finally an alternative to testing model 5 (if the probability of 
repurchasing is more sensitive to prior losses compared to prior gains) is to split the 
sample by firms that have prior gains in any given quarter versus firms with prior losses 
and run model 4 on both subsamples (see  model 6 and 7 respectively).  
Across all models in Table 4, the prior determinants have their expected signs and 
they are all statistically significant at an alpha level of 1%. The analysis provides 
evidence that firms may use stock repurchases to mitigate agency problems as the 
probability of repurchasing is positively related to the level of cash and cash flows 
(scaled by total assets). There is also evidence of the undervaluation hypothesis as the 
probability of repurchasing is positively related to the  book-to-market ratio, and firm size 
firm; and is negatively related to the stock return in the prior quarter. Finally leverage is 
associated with a negative probability of repurchasing. 
With regards to the first question: does the probability that a firm repurchases its 
stock depends systematically on its cumulative returns from prior stock repurchases? 
Models 2 and 4 provide evidence suggesting a positive association between past stock 
repurchase returns and the probability of repurchasing new shares, ceteris paribus. 
Turning to the next question: is the probability that a firm repurchases its stock 
more sensitive to past losses compared to past gains? That is, is there is an asymmetry 
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between prior cumulative negative and positive repurchase returns? Models 3 and 5 show 
that conditioning on prior losses, an increase in prior losses is associated with a decrease 
in the probability of stock repurchases (- 4.356 and – 3.202 in models 3 and 5 
respectively). Conversely, given prior losses, a decrease in prior losses (if losses become 
less negative) is associated with an increase in the probability of repurchasing. On the 
other hand, given prior gains, an increase in gains has no significant effect on the 
probability of repurchasing. These results are confirmed in model 6 where we split the 
sample into firms quarters in which firms have prior accumulated gains versus prior 
accumulated losses. 
Taken together the results suggest that the cumulative returns from prior stock 
repurchases are positively related to the probability of stock repurchases however, this 
effect seems to be primarily driven by prior negative stock repurchase returns. Managers 
tend to be sensitive to prior losses. These results also suggest that managers are loss 
averse. 
4.2 The impact of past repurchase returns on the decision to repurchase new shares over 
different horizons 
In the preceding analysis, returns from prior stock repurchases are measured from 
the time a firm enters the sample until the third quarter of 2011 or until the firm delists. A 
potential issue with measuring the repurchase returns this way is that we am assuming the 
outcome of all prior stock repurchasing decisions equally affect stock repurchases at time 
t which may be implausible. For example, for a firm that has repurchased stocks every 
quarter since 1984 we assume that repurchases conducted in 1984 and repurchases one 
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quarter ago equally influence the manager’s decision today. we address this issue in this 
subsection by measuring the repurchase returns using three-, five-, and ten-year rolling 
windows (REPO_RET3t-1, REPO5_RETt-1, and REPO10_RETt-1 respectively). The 
rational is that most open market repurchase programs take on average 3 to 4 years to 
complete and, as panel B of table 2 shows, the average CEO tenure in our sample is 5.3 
years. 
 Table 5 presents fixed effect logit regression results for equation 2 using 
REPO_RET3t-1, REPO5_RETt-1, and REPO10_RETt-1; and LOSS3t-1, LOSS5t-1, and 
LOSS10t-1 respectively in lieu of REPO_RETt-1 and LOSSt-1.  
Table 5 shows that given prior negative stock repurchase returns (losses), an 
increase in losses is associated with a lower probability of repurchasing across all rolling 
windows. On the other hand, for firms with positive stock repurchase returns (gains), 
further gains tend to produce small additional probability of repurchases; at least for the 
three-, and five-year rolling windows. Finally, the results in this table confirm the results 
in the preceding section as managers seem to be more sensitive to negative stock 
repurchase returns (losses) than positive stock repurchase returns (gains). Thus taken 
together, the decision to repurchase stock is driven by managers’ sensitivity to past 
losses, ceteris paribus. 
4.3. The impact of past repurchase returns on the decision to repurchase new shares – 
the effect of CEO characteristics  
To control for the possibility that the results are not due to managerial biases or 
loss aversion, but due to some unobservable firm-level feature, (1) we measure the stock 
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repurchase returns over the tenure of a CEO in any given firm6; (2) we include CEO fixed 
effects in the multivariate logit analysis (Bertrand and Schoar 2003 find that manager 
fixed effects are related to a variety of corporate decisions including dividend policy.); 
and (3) we examine cross-sectional variation in our results as a function of two CEO-
level characteristics: tenure and age.  Prendergast and Stole (1996) present a model in 
which individuals want to acquire a reputation for quickly learning a correct course of 
action.  This desire leads to two types of sub-optimal behavior:  exaggeration, in which 
individuals respond too much to new information; and conservatism, in which behavior is 
not changed enough in the light of new information.  In their model, individuals early in 
their job tenure tend to respond too much, while those with longer tenure respond too 
little.   Drawing upon these results, we hypothesize that CEOs with the shortest tenure 
will exhibit behavior that is most sensitive to realized gains and losses, while long-tenure 
CEOs will be the least sensitive. 
With respect to the link between age and loss aversion, Johnson et. al. (2006) find 
an increasing relationship between risk aversion and age, while Hjorth and Fosgerau 
(2009) find that loss aversion increases with age up to around 55 years, and then declines 
rapidly.  Bertrand and Schoar (2003), after controlling for fixed differences across firms 
and other time varying firm factors, find that executives from earlier birth cohorts tend to 
                                                           
6
 The rational for measuring gains and losses from repurchases based on a CEO’s tenure within the firm is 
an intuitive one. To the extent that CEOs influence their firm’s payout policy what matters most to any 
CEO are  the gains from repurchases under their tenure and not those their predecessors. A specific CEO 
may have cumulated losses which could induce that CEO to be loss averse and then a new CEO comes in 
and “does their own thing.” For example Apple under Steve Jobs didn’t payout but one year after Steve 
Job’s death, Apple under the new CEO, Tim Cook announced a $2.65 quarterly dividend and a three year 
share repurchase program of about $45 billion. Besides the availability of excess cash some analysts 
attribute these payout decision to the new CEO and hold Steve Jobs philosophy on the contrary was to 
“hoard cash” and this was in part due to his “long memory” when he returned to Apple in 1997 at which 
point the firm was struggling and using more cash that it could earn. 
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/apple-aapl-changed-year-steve-jobs-
death/story?id=17387066#.UJ1pb4Yau4q    
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be more conservative in corporate decision making. Because the majority of the CEO 
sample is in the 50 to 55 years age range, it is unclear whether there is enough age 
variation to find a linear relationship between loss aversion and age. 
Table 6 presents CEO fixed effects logit regressions of quarterly stock repurchase 
activity from 1993-2011 using the Execucomp sample.  The repurchase returns 
(REPO_RET_CEO) in this table are measured over the tenure of each CEO. 
The first model shows that there is no evidence that returns from prior stock 
repurchases have any effect on the probability to repurchase stock. However the second 
model reveals that managers view losses differently from gains and that losses are what 
really matter.  One can see that negative repurchase returns (losses) are negatively 
associated with the probability of repurchasing stocks. Also the coefficient on 
REPO_RET_CEO x LOSS_RET_CEO has the biggest magnitude. Although there is also a 
negative relationship between prior positive repurchase returns (gains) and the probability 
of repurchasing, the is effect not to be economically significant. The results in the first 
two columns are consistent with the findings in the preceding sections. Thus, regardless 
of how the repurchase returns are measured, the results show that managers are more 
sensitive to past losses than past gains. 
The third to sixth models control for the possibility that the results are not due to 
managerial biases or loss aversion, but due to some unobservable firm-level feature, by 
separately controlling for CEO tenure and CEO age. The third and fourth model control 
for tenure by splitting the sample into CEOs who are below median tenure and CEOs 
whose tenure is greater or equal to the median, tenure and conduct the logit analysis on 
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each of these sub-samples. The results are consistent with the previous analysis in that 
prior negative repurchase returns are negatively associated with the probability of 
repurchasing across CEOs below or above median tenure. But this sensitivity is more 
pronounced in CEOs with lower tenure compared to CEOS above median tenure CEOs 
(the difference between both coefficients is statistically and economically significant). 
Similarly, in the fifth and sixth model, the sample is split into CEOs whose ages 
are below the sample CEO median age and those whose ages are equal to or above the 
sample median age respectively. Once again, the results are consistent with the previous 
analysis in that prior negative repurchase returns are negatively associated with the 
probability of repurchasing across CEOs below or above the sample median age. But 
there is no evidence that age is a factor since the difference of coefficient on 
REPO_RET_CEO x LOSS_RET_CEO across both sample are neither statistically nor 
economically significant. This could be due to the fact that the majority of CEOs in our 
sample are between the ages of 50 and 57. 
Taken together, the results up this point can be summarized as follows: when 
deciding to repurchase shares  not only do managers seem to be more sensitive to losses 
from prior stock repurchase programs than prior gains but the losses are what seem to 
matter. We present this as evidence of managerial loss aversion. Secondly the loss 
aversion that we document seems to be related to CEO tenure as tenured CEOs seem to 
be less prone to loss aversion. 
4.4. The impact of past repurchase returns on the level of stock repurchase  
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Up until this point the focus has been to test whether there is relationship between 
outcome of prior repurchasing activity and the decision to repurchase stocks in a given 
quarter. The focus of this subsection is to test whether there is a relationship between past 
repurchase returns and the level of stock repurchases in a given quarter. The dependent 
variable in this section is the dollars spent on stock repurchases in any given quarter 
scaled by the market capitalization at the end of the prior quarter. The dependent 
variables are the same as in the previous subsections with Logit analysis.  
Given that there are many quarters in which firms do not conduct stock 
repurchases there are large clusters of zeroes in the dependent variable thus a linear 
regression would be in appropriate in this instance thus we use cross-sectional Tobit 
regressions, and Fama-Macbeth method to estimate the coefficients and the standard 
errors. The results of the Tobit Regressions are reported in table 7. 
Across all models cash, cash flows, book-to-market and size, the prior quarter’s 
stock return and leverage have their expected signs and for the most part are significantly 
different from zero. Table 7 also shows some evidence of loss aversion particularly in 
models three and four which reveals that given losses from prior stock repurchasing 
activity further increases in losses are associated with lower levels of spending on stock 
repurchases. On the other hand given prior gains there is no evidence that additional 
gains have any effect on the level of spending on stock repurchases. Thus taken together 
we provide evidence that when deciding to repurchase shares  not only do firms seem to 
be more sensitive to losses from prior stock repurchase programs than prior gains but the 
losses are what seem to matter (loss aversion). Secondly the loss aversion that we 
document seems to be related to CEO tenure as tenured CEOs seem to be less prone to 
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loss aversion. Thirdly we provide some evidence which suggests that firms are also loss 
averse when deciding on how much to spend on stock repurchases. 
 
5. Implication: The impact of past repurchase returns on the dividend-repurchase 
substitution 
Up to this point we provide evidence supporting the idea that the outcome of past 
stock repurchasing activity as measured by the returns from past stock repurchases do 
influence future stock repurchasing decisions. Particularly we find evidence of 
managerial loss aversion namely that not only are managers more sensitive to prior losses 
than gains, but they seem to be entirely sensitive only to prior losses. In this section, we 
turn to the implications of the outcome of past stock repurchasing activities on dividend 
policy. 
The analysis in this section is based on Grullon and Michaelly (2002) who 
compute a firm’s dividend forecast error as the diffidence between a firm’s actual 
dividend payment and the expected dividend payment based on Lintner’s  (1956) model. 
They find a negative correlation between firms dividend forecast errors and stock 
repurchase activity. This is presented as evidence of the substitution hypothesis, namely, 
that funds that would otherwise be used to increases dividends are used to repurchase 
stock. 
We examine the role if any the outcome of prior repurchasing activity has on the 
dividend forecast error. Specifically, whether the substitution hypothesis documented by 
Grullon and Michaelly (2002) is weaker (stronger) for firms that repurchase their stock 
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and have prior negative realized repurchase returns (positive realized repurchase returns).  
We use the same methodology as Grullon and Michaelly (2002), but different preforecast 
and forecast windows. Their study uses 1973 to 1983 and 1973 to 1990 as their 
preforecast periods. We use 1985 to 1994 (this study begins from the period stock 
repurchases begin to be a competing payout choice7 in this sample), and 1995 to 2010 as 
our forecast period.   
For each firm we define the forecast error as: 
**2*, 
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         eq.3 
Where ∆HIJ, is the actual change in dividends in year t for the i'th firm. )*K,, 
is the earnings in year t for the i’th firm (defined as total earnings before extraordinary 
items – COMPUSTAT IB). HIJ, is the dividend level in year t-1 (defined as the dollar 
amount of dividends declared on the common stock of a firm during the year – 
COMPUSTAT DVC). #,is the market value of equity in year t-1 (defined as  
market value of common stock at end of year – COMPUSTAT PRCC_C multiplied by 
CSHO) . The coefficients , and ,are estimated for each firm over the preforecast 
period and are the parameters of earnings and lagged dividends, respectively, from 
Lintner’s (1965) model. To enter the sample, each firm-year must have information on 
the following variables: Earn, MV, Div, and RYIELD (the total expenditure on share 
repurchases at time t scaled by the market value of equity at time t – 1)8.  Finally each 
                                                           
7
 From 1985, the dollars spent on repurchase start to consistently increase in my sample 
8
 To be consistent with Grullon and Michaelly (2002), stock repurchases are defined as total expenditure on 
the purchase of common and preferred stocks minus any reduction in the value of the net number of 
preferred stocks outstanding. (This variable is not available for banks, utilities, and insurance companies. 
Therefore, these types of firms are not included in our final sample.)  
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firm must have paid dividends continuously over the entire preforecast period of 1985 to 
1994. 
To examine the role of prior losses from stock repurchases on the dividend 
substitution hypothesis we estimate the following cross-sectional model based on Grullon 
and Michaelly (2002): 
**2*   ,   ,'"H   ,"%L_#   ,%  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The estimated model is a cross-sectional regression of the forecast error on the 
repurchase yield, the log of firm size, return on assets, the volatility of the return on 
assets, non-operating income scaled by total assets, the debt-to-total assets ratio 
augmented with our loss variable (a dummy variables that equals one when the stock 
repurchase return is negative and zero otherwise), and an interaction between the gain 
yield and loss dummy variable. We use the Fama and Macbeth method to estimate the 
coefficients and the standard errors.  If firms experience losses in their portfolio of 
repurchased stocks, we expect less substitution of dividends with stock repurchases as 
managers may become wary of using stock repurchases and timing the market. 
Conversely, if firms experience gains from stock repurchases we expect the substitution 
of dividends with stock repurchases to strengthen. Thus while we expect ,  to be 
negative and statistically significant we expect β0,Oto be positive and statistically 
significant. Table 8 reports the results with the losses from stock repurchases measured 
using three -, five-, ten-year rolling windows, and over the entire forecast period of 1995 
to 2010 in models one to four respectively. 
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The results in table 8 show that the substitution of stock repurchases in lieu of 
dividends tends to be weaker when firms experience losses from past stock repurchases. 
Thus the findings are consistent with Grullon and Michaelly (2002) since the findings 
suggests that firms not only finance stock repurchases with funds that otherwise would 
have been used to increase dividends but  less so when they have prior losses from stock 
repurchase and more so if they have prior gains.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Stock repurchases are risky investments made by management on behalf of 
current shareholders. There is an extensive literature which documents “rational” 
motivations for managers repurchasing their firm’s stock. Where rational means stock 
repurchases are used as a tool that benefits the firm’s shareholders in some way by 
increasing, or at least holding constant, firm value. DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner 
(2008) provide anecdotal evidence of firms repurchasing their stocks at high prices prior 
to the 2008 financial crisis.  They question managers’ ability to time the market and ask 
whether repurchasing activity will ever return to pre-2008 levels.  
At odds with the notion of rationality is the recent empirical work of Bonaime et 
al. (2012) who find that, on average, managers exhibit a propensity to mis-time stock 
repurchases and in the process destroy significant amounts shareholder wealth.  Their 
results follow a line of research suggesting investment decisions may be influenced by 
past returns (outcome of prior investment decisions).   
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We hypothesize that in addition to being influenced by recent returns, managerial 
stock repurchases may also be influenced by the rate of return on the existing portfolio of 
repurchased stock generated from prior gains and losses from stock repurchases.  This is 
consistent with research demonstrating that in a variety of contexts, decisions under 
uncertainty can be substantially affected by the outcomes of past decisions (see for 
example, Thaler 1980; Staw 1981; Arkes and Blumer 1985).  Thaler and Johnson (1990) 
investigate how prior gains and losses affect risk taking behavior.  Based on experimental 
data from Cornell undergraduate and MBA students they find increased willingness to 
take risk after prior gains, which they refer to as the “house money effect”.   However, 
after experiencing a prior loss, individuals showed increased loss aversion and a 
decreased willingness to take risk.  
We begin our empirical work by calculating at the firm-level gains and losses on 
repurchased stock, and examining the impact of past repurchase returns on the decision to 
repurchase new shares.  In this empirical work, we examine gains and losses separately to 
allow for the possibility of an asymmetric response, which might obtain if managers 
exhibit loss aversion (Johnson and Thaler, 1990). we find evidence of loss aversion; 
specifically, that firms are unlikely to repurchase stocks when they lose money from past 
stock repurchases; and almost no evidence that past gains on repurchases influence future 
repurchasing activity even after controlling for variables previously shown to affect 
repurchase activity (e.g. cash, cash flow, book-to-market ratio, firm size, past one-quarter 
return, etc.). 
To control for the possibility that the results are not due to managerial biases or 
loss aversion, but due to some unobservable firm-level feature, we examine cross-
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sectional variation in our results as a function of two CEO-level characteristics: tenure 
and age. We find that manager’s decreased propensity to conduct stock repurchases given 
losses from prior stock repurchases (loss aversion) is more pronounced in firms whose 
CEOs have shorter tenure.  
We also provide some evidence suggesting that given losses from prior stock 
repurchasing activity further increases in losses are associated with lower levels of 
spending on stock repurchases and no evidence that additional gains have any effect on 
the level of spending on stock repurchases. 
Finally, we show that the “loss-aversion” effect on repurchases indirectly affects 
dividend payouts. Specifically, the dividend-repurchase substitution rate slows down for 
firms that experience losses in their past repurchase activities. 
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Table 2 
Summary statistics 
This table provides summary statistics for variables used in the study. Panel A is based on the largest 
sample from COMPUSTAT universe. Panel B is based on Execucomp firms, for which we can 
identify the tenure of the CEO. Panel C is based on dividend-repurchase substitution sample used in 
Grullon and Michaely (2002). Sample period is 1984-2011 and variables are winsorized at 1% on each 
tail. REPODUMt is a dummy variable that equals one when the firm buys back stock during the quarter 
and zero otherwise. CASHt-1 is one-quarter lagged cash and short-term investments scaled by total 
assets (COMPUSTAT: CHEQ/ ATQ). CFt-1 is one-quarter lagged operating income before 
depreciation scaled by total assets (COMPUSTAT: OIBDPQ / ATQ). BMt-1 is one-quarter lagged 
book-to-market ratio. Book value is defined as total common or ordinary equity (COMPUSTAT: 
CEQQ) and the market value is defined as last trading day of the quarter shares outstanding (CRSP: 
SHROUT) multiplied by the closing price (CRSP: PRC). SIZEt-1 is the natural log of total assets 
(COMPUSTAT: ATQ). RETt-1, is the cumulative stock return for the past quarter based on the monthly 
returns from CRSP. LEVt-1 is one-quarter lagged total liabilities scaled by total assets (COMPUSTAT: 
LTQ/ATQ). REPO_RET is the cumulative value of all stocks a firm has repurchased minus the dollars 
spent on those repurchases (reference point) scaled by total assets. LOSS is a dummy variable that 
equals one when REPO_RET is negative and zero otherwise. REPO_RET10, REPO_RET5, and 
REPO_RET3 are the cumulative values of all stocks a firm has repurchased minus the dollars spent on 
those repurchases (reference point) scaled by total assets using a 10 year, 5 year and 3 year rolling 
window respectively. LOSS10, LOSS5 and LOSS3 are dummy variables that equal one when 
REPO_RET10, REPO_RET5 and REPO_RET3 are negative respectively and zero otherwise. TENURE 
is the number of quarters the CEO has spent at the firm and AGE is the CEO’s age in years. 
REPO_RET_CEO is the cumulative value of all stocks a firm has repurchased under the CEO minus 
the dollars spent on those repurchases (reference point) scaled by total assets. LOSS_RET_CEO is a 
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dummy variable that equals one when REPO_RET_CEO is negative and zero otherwise.  RYIELD is 
the total expenditure on share repurchases at time t scaled by the market value of equity at time t - 1. 
LOG_MV is the natural log of the market value of equity. ROA is the operating income before 
depreciation scaled by the book value of the total. SIGMA_ROA is the standard deviation of ROA over 
the three years surrounding the firm year observation. NOPER is the nonoperating income before 
depreciation scaled by the book value of the total assets. DEBT is the book value of total long-term 
debt plus the book value of total short-term debt scaled by the book value of the total assets. In the 
dividend-repurchase substitution sample past accumulated returns on the repurchase portfolio is 
calculated by scaling with the market value of equity to be consistent with other variables used in 
Grullon and Michaely (2002). RYIELD, NOPER, and DEBT are truncated at the 99th percentile and 
ROA is truncated at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
Panel A: Summary statistics for the main sample 
Variable N Mean Std 1% 25% 50% 75% 99% 
REPODUMt 222,890 0.256 0.436 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
CASHt-1 222,613 0.151 0.184 0.000 0.020 0.072 0.214 0.816 
CFt-1 200,810 0.026 0.044 -0.180 0.014 0.031 0.048 0.126 
BMt-1 221,797 0.687 0.611 -0.591 0.317 0.545 0.885 3.540 
SIZEt-1 222,890 5.458 2.067 1.138 3.945 5.340 6.875 10.481 
RETt-1 222,639 0.036 0.268 -0.564 -0.118 0.014 0.155 1.094 
LEVt-1 222,852 0.491 0.235 0.060 0.313 0.490 0.643 1.210 
REPO_RET
 
222,890 0.058 0.233 -0.553 -0.006 0.003 0.054 1.377 
LOSS 222,890 0.399 0.490 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
REPO_RET10 222,890 0.029 0.150 -0.447 -0.006 0.001 0.032 0.828 
LOSS10 222,890 0.409 0.492 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
REPO_RET5 222,890 0.010 0.077 -0.269 -0.003 0.000 0.012 0.418 
LOSS5 222,890 0.389 0.488 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
REPO_RET3 222,890 0.005 0.040 -0.147 -0.001 0.000 0.004 0.223 
LOSS3 222,890 0.348 0.476 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
         
1-digit SIC Industry definition N 
0 Agriculture 875 
1 Mining, oil and const. 14,525 
2 Food, beverage and chemicals 43,023 
3 Plastics, computer and machinery 79,832 
4 Railroads and airlines 12,803 
5 Wholesale and retail 29,032 
7 Arts, recreations, technical services 31,203 
8 Healthcare, professional, social assistance and education services 10,230 
9 Public administration services 1,367 
 Total 222,890 
 
 
 
Panel B: Summary statistics for the Execucomp sample 
Variable N Mean Std 1% 25% 50% 75% 99% 
REPODUMt 80,217 0.339 0.473 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
CASHt-1 80,177 0.141 0.165 0.001 0.021 0.071 0.204 0.713 
CFt-1 74,695 0.038 0.028 -0.059 0.024 0.037 0.053 0.128 
BMt-1 79,927 0.521 0.388 -0.177 0.271 0.437 0.668 2.216 
SIZEt-1 80,217 7.073 1.603 3.576 5.925 6.947 8.099 11.199 
RETt-1 80,192 0.043 0.227 -0.509 -0.089 0.031 0.155 0.852 
LEVt-1 80,201 0.504 0.211 0.082 0.354 0.512 0.640 1.114 
TENURE 80,217 21.249 17.486 1.000 8.000 17.000 30.000 80.000 
AGE 79,948 53.520 7.853 37.000 48.000 53.000 58.000 76.000 
REPO_RET_CEO 80,217 0.043 0.139 -0.256 0.000 0.001 0.036 0.827 
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LOSS_RET_CEO 80,217 0.285 0.452 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
         
1-digit SIC Industry definition N 
0 Agriculture 290 
1 Mining, oil and const. 4,995 
2 Food, beverage and chemicals 17,635 
3 Plastics, computer and machinery 27,454 
4 Railroads and airlines 4,944 
5 Wholesale and retail 11,070 
7 Arts, recreations, technical services 10,457 
8 Healthcare, professional, social assistance and education services 3,083 
9 Public administration services 289 
 Total 80,217 
 
Panel C: Summary statistics for the dividend-repurchase substitution sample 
Variable N Mean Std 1% 25% 50% 75% 99% 
REPODUMt 8,949 0.641 0.480 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
RYIELDt 8,949 0.018 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.026 0.140 
LOG_MVt 8,949 7.260 1.964 2.639 5.964 7.275 8.570 11.881 
ROAt 8,758 0.138 0.066 0.002 0.094 0.131 0.177 0.331 
SIGMA_ROAt 8,376 0.022 0.022 0.001 0.008 0.015 0.028 0.102 
NOPERt 8,945 0.006 0.010 -0.016 0.000 0.003 0.008 0.041 
DEBTt 8,671 0.213 0.144 0.000 0.092 0.213 0.315 0.568 
REPO_RET 8,949 0.157 0.747 -0.843 0.012 0.098 0.270 1.491 
LOSS 8,949 0.162 0.368 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
REPO_RET10 8,949 0.030 0.245 -0.475 -0.002 0.012 0.066 0.533 
LOSS10 8,949 0.278 0.448 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
REPO_RET5 8,949 0.007 0.100 -0.208 -0.002 0.000 0.016 0.220 
LOSS5 8,949 0.321 0.467 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
REPO_RET3 8,949 0.004 0.060 -0.097 -0.001 0.000 0.006 0.112 
LOSS3 8,949 0.304 0.460 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
         
1-digit SIC Industry definition N 
0 Agriculture 40 
1 Mining, oil and const. 238 
2 Food, beverage and chemicals 2,235 
3 Plastics, computer and machinery 2,491 
4 Railroads and airlines 1,556 
5 Wholesale and retail 1,039 
7 Arts, recreations, technical services 451 
8 Healthcare, professional, social assistance and education services 102 
9 Public administration services 50 
 Total 8,202 
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Table 3 
Annual stock repurchases and cumulative gains from repurchasing   
This table provides annual statistics on stock repurchases and the cumulative dollar gains relative to 
repurchases prices (reference point) in our sample. A firm is said to repurchase its stock in a given 
quarter when it repurchases at least 0.1 percent of the previous quarter’s market capitalization. # Repo 
init. are the total number of firms that enter the sample for the first time. It is the number of firms that 
repurchase at least 0.1 percent of the previous quarter’s market capitalization for the first time. # Repo 
firms are the total number of firms that repurchased stocks at least once in any given year. Sum qtrly. 
repo are the total quarterly dollars spent on repurchases in a given year in nominal dollars(where 
quarterly repurchases are computed as COMPUSTAT purchase of common and preferred stock minus 
and increases in preferred stock measured in millions of dollars). Sum qtrly. repo 2011$ are the total 
quarterly dollars spent on repurchases in a given year are in 2011 dollars using the 2011 GDP deflator.  
Sum qtrly.$ gains are quarterly cumulative dollar gains/losses in repurchases relative to repurchase 
prices (reference point) measured in millions of dollars. Sum qtrly. $ gains 2011$ are quarterly 
cumulative dollar gains/losses in repurchases relative to repurchase prices (reference point) measured 
in 2011 dollars using the 2011 GDP deflator. Avg. qtrly. repo and Avg. qtrly. $ gains are the average 
quarterly dollars spent on repurchases and average quarterly cumulative dollar gains/losses in 
repurchases relative to repurchase prices in a given year respectively. Recession years are shaded and 
are from the NBER (http://www.nber.org/cycles/). The first recession in the sample began in 3rd 
quarter of 1990 through the first quarter of 1991. The second recession spanned the first quarter of 
2001 to the 4th quarter. The last recession spanned the 4th quarter of 2007 to the 2nd quarter of 2009.  
GDP deflator data are from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
(http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDPDEF/downloaddata?cid=21)       
Year # Repo. 
# 
Repo. 
Sum qtrly. 
repo. ($ 
Sum 
qtrly. 
Sum qtrly.  
$ gains ($ 
Sum qtrly. 
$ gains 
Avg. 
qtrly. 
Avg. qtrly. 
$ gains ($ 
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Init. firms millions) repo. 
2011$ 
($ 
millions) 
millions) 2011$ ($ 
millions) 
repo. ($ 
millions) 
millions) 
1984 627 627 13,360 25,186 -3 -6 13.35 0 
1985 509 936 38,568 70,747 11,245 20,628 10.34 3.03 
1986 338 924 24,707 44,304 43,148 77,372 5.14 9.06 
1987 558 1323 40,072 69,703 142,470 247,822 6.69 23.99 
1988 303 1253 39,677 66,556 121,626 204,020 5.37 16.58 
1989 166 994 41,762 67,698 242,637 393,326 5.54 32.42 
1990 205 1090 36,746 57,190 233,849 363,956 4.81 30.83 
1991 113 899 21,264 32,075 425,917 642,446 2.72 55.01 
1992 151 795 25,523 37,679 556,412 821,402 3.23 71.18 
1993 166 853 30,240 43,690 708,961 1,024,276 3.68 87.16 
1994 188 962 36,240 51,267 728,550 1,030,645 4.25 86.22 
1995 225 1100 62,854 87,166 1,173,877 1,627,918 7.05 132.84 
1996 281 1246 74,519 101,471 1,781,840 2,426,312 7.94 191.29 
1997 311 1405 110,499 148,086 2,769,400 3,711,429 11.12 281.39 
1998 474 1819 141,711 187,854 3,769,418 4,996,797 13.52 363.35 
1999 317 1845 153,548 200,475 4,592,154 5,995,600 13.96 422.58 
2000 225 1649 153,639 195,790 4,790,722 6,105,068 14.28 450.98 
2001 212 1412 130,471 163,013 3,716,220 4,643,116 12.54 363.2 
2002 180 1250 123,401 151,420 2,924,393 3,588,421 12.01 289.8 
2003 103 1142 137,059 164,768 3,101,653 3,728,703 13.56 313.84 
2004 102 1025 195,751 227,978 4,387,941 5,110,327 19.98 458.27 
2005 107 1117 322,241 362,592 4,991,193 5,616,189 33.62 531.43 
2006 86 1191 442,080 483,667 5,720,283 6,258,402 47.29 621.77 
2007 128 1293 560,189 597,003 7,515,406 8,009,299 62.25 845.76 
2008 167 1437 430,507 448,968 4,430,676 4,620,672 48.16 499.68 
2009 68 985 168,056 174,476 2,201,430 2,285,522 19.1 252.23 
2010 68 1058 278,853 284,320 4,970,067 5,067,517 32.9 589.08 
2011 82 1143 355,887 355,887 5,763,260 5,763,260 54.35 880.83 
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Table 5 
The impact of past repurchase returns on the decision to repurchase new shares 
Past returns are cumulated over different horizons 
This table presents firm fixed effects logit regressions on quarterly stock repurchase activity from 
1984-2011 using alternative horizons for past returns.  The dependent variable is REPODUMt that 
equals one when the firm buys back stock during the quarter and zero otherwise. CASHt-1 is one-
quarter lagged cash and short-term investments scaled by total assets (COMPUSTAT: CHEQ/ ATQ). 
CFt-1 is one-quarter lagged operating income before depreciation scaled by total assets 
(COMPUSTAT: OIBDPQ / ATQ). BMt-1 is one-quarter lagged book-to-market ratio. Book value is 
defined as total common or ordinary equity (COMPUSTAT: CEQQ) and the market value is defined 
as last trading day of the quarter shares outstanding (CRSP: SHROUT) multiplied by the closing price 
(CRSP: PRC). SIZEt-1 is the natural log of total assets (COMPUSTAT: ATQ). RETt-1, is the cumulative 
stock return for the past quarter based on the monthly returns from CRSP. LEVt-1 is one-quarter lagged 
total liabilities scaled by total assets (COMPUSTAT: LTQ/ATQ). REPO_RET10, REPO_RET5, and 
REPO_RET3 are the cumulative values of all stocks a firm has repurchased minus the dollars spent on 
those repurchases (reference point) scaled by total assets using a 10 year, 5 year and 3 year rolling 
window respectively. LOSS10, LOSS5 and LOSS3 are dummy variables that equal one when 
REPO_RET10, REPO_RET5 and REPO_RET3 are negative respectively and zero otherwise. Variables 
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are winsorized at 1% on each tail. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. 
 
Hypotheses Variables 
Dependent variable = REPO_DUMt 
   
   
[1] [2] [3] 
   Agency CASHt-1 (+) 1.194*** 1.210*** 1.235*** 
  CFt-1 (+) 5.455*** 5.221*** 4.861*** 
Undervaluation BMt-1 (+) 0.087*** 0.118*** 0.169*** 
SIZEt-1 (+) 0.270*** 0.257*** 0.212*** 
  RETt-1 (-) -0.459*** -0.548*** -0.623*** 
Leverage LEVt-1 (-) -2.211*** -2.121*** -1.992*** 
Loss aversion  REPO_RET3 2.117***   
 LOSS3 0.445***   
 REPO_RET3 x LOSS3 2.451***   
 REPO_RET5  0.315***  
 LOSS5  0.279***  
 REPO_RET5 x LOSS5  3.842***  
 REPO_RET10   -0.108* 
 LOSS10   0.138*** 
 REPO_RET10 x LOSS10   3.546*** 
     
Firm effects  Included Included Included 
Year effects  Included Included Included 
Pseudo-R2  0.0383 0.0367 0.0369 
N 199,660 199,660 199,660 
# REPO_DUMt=1 51,197 51,197 51,197 
# firms   4,859 4,859 4,859 
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Table 7 
Tobit Regression Analysis on the Intensity of Stock Repurchases 
This table presents Tobit regression analysis on quarterly stock repurchase activity from 1984-2011. 
The dependent variable across all models is the dollars spent on the repurchase of common stock in 
any given quarter scaled by the market capitalization at the end of the prior quarter (REPOt). CASHt-1 is 
one-quarter lagged cash and short-term investments scaled by total assets (COMPUSTAT: CHEQ/ 
ATQ). CFt-1 is one-quarter lagged operating income before depreciation scaled by total assets 
(COMPUSTAT: OIBDPQ / ATQ). BMt-1 is one-quarter lagged book-to-market ratio. Book value is 
defined as total common or ordinary equity (COMPUSTAT: CEQQ) and the market value is defined 
as last trading day of the quarter shares outstanding (CRSP: SHROUT) multiplied by the closing price 
(CRSP: PRC). SIZEt-1 is the natural log of total assets (COMPUSTAT: ATQ). RETt-1, is the cumulative 
stock return for the past quarter based on the monthly returns from CRSP. LEVt-1 is one-quarter lagged 
total liabilities scaled by total assets (COMPUSTAT: LTQ/ATQ). REPO_RET is the cumulative value 
of all stocks a firm has repurchased minus the dollars spent on those repurchases (reference point) 
scaled by lagged market value of equity. LOSS is a dummy variable that equals one when REPO_RET 
is negative and zero otherwise. REPO_RET10, REPO_RET5, and REPO_RET3 are the cumulative 
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values of all stocks a firm has repurchased minus the dollars spent on those repurchases (reference 
point) scaled  by the lagged market value of equity using a 10-year, 5-year and 3-year rolling window 
respectively. LOSS10, LOSS5 and LOSS3 are dummy variables that equal one when REPO_RET10, 
REPO_RET5 and REPO_RET3 are negative respectively and zero otherwise. REPO_RET_CEO is the 
cumulative value of all stocks a firm has repurchased under the CEO minus the dollars spent on those 
repurchases (reference point) scaled by total assets. LOSS_RET_CEO is a dummy variable that equals 
one when REPO_RET_CEO is negative and zero otherwise. Coefficients are estimated based on two 
stage Fama-MacBeth regressions. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively.  
 
Hyp. Variables 
Dependent variable = REPOt   
     
     
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
   
  
 INTERCEPT -8.01*** -7.87*** -7.69*** -7.58*** -4.19*** 
Agency CASHt-1 (+) 2.56*** 2.68*** 2.86*** 2.98*** 0.65*** 
  CFt-1 (+) 19.32*** 18.98*** 18.25*** 18.42*** 13.65*** 
Underval BMt-1 (+) 0.62*** 0.67*** 0.77*** 0.78*** -0.10 
SIZEt-1 (+) 0.61*** 0.61*** 
0.60 
*** 0.58*** 0.37*** 
  RETt-1 (-) -0.20 -0.54** -0.81*** -0.83*** -0.10 
Leverage LEVt-1 (-) -2.08*** -2.07*** -1.91*** -1.82*** -1.32*** 
Loss 
aversion  REPO_RET3 -3211.40     
 LOSS3 1.39***     
 
REPO_RET3 x 
LOSS3 -0.30     
 REPO_RET5  -3220.20    
 LOSS5  0.70***    
 
REPO_RET5 x 
LOSS5  8.40  
  
 REPO_RET10   -3223.90   
 LOSS10   0.10   
 
REPO_RET10 x 
LOSS10   11.85* 
  
 REPO_RET    -3225.10  
 LOSS    -0.06  
 
REPO_RET3 x 
LOSS    13.47** 
 
 REPO_RET_CEO     2.34*** 
 LOSS_RET_CEO     0.72*** 
 
REPO_RET_CEO x 
LOSS_RET_CEO     0.80 
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Table 8 
The impact of past repurchase returns on the dividend-repurchase substitution 
The dependent variable is dividend forecast error (ERRORi,t) computed for the forecasting period of 
1995-2010 consistent with Grullon and Michaely. ERRORt  is defined as: 
1,
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where ∆Divi,t is the actual change in dividends in year t; Earni, t is the earnings in year t; Divi,t is the 
dividend level in year t-1, and MVi, t-1 is the market value of equity in year t-1. β1, i β2, i and β3,i  are 
estimated for each firm (denoted by i) over the preforecast period based on Lintner’s (1965) model. To 
be included in the sample, each firm must have paid dividends continuously over the entire preforecast 
period of 1985 to 1994. To eliminate the effect of outliers forecast errors with absolute values greater 
than 5% are eliminated. RYIELD is the total expenditure on share repurchases at time t scaled by the 
market value of equity at time t - 1. LOG_MV is the natural log of the market value of equity. ROA is 
the operating income before depreciation scaled by the book value of the total. SIGMA_ROA is the 
standard deviation of ROA over the three years surrounding the firm year observation. NOPER is the 
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nonoperating income before depreciation scaled by the book value of the total assets. DEBT is the 
book value of total long-term debt plus the book value of total short-term debt scaled by the book value 
of the total assets. REPO_RET is the cumulative value of all stocks a firm has repurchased minus the 
dollars spent on those repurchases (reference point) scaled by lagged market value of equity. LOSS is a 
dummy variable that equals one when REPO_RET is negative and zero otherwise. REPO_RET10, 
REPO_RET5, and REPO_RET3 are the cumulative values of all stocks a firm has repurchased minus 
the dollars spent on those repurchases (reference point) scaled  by the lagged market value of equity 
using a 10-year, 5-year and 3-year rolling window respectively. LOSS10, LOSS5 and LOSS3 are 
dummy variables that equal one when REPO_RET10, REPO_RET5 and REPO_RET3 are negative 
respectively and zero otherwise. Coefficients are estimated based on two stage Fama-MacBeth 
regressions. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Variables Dependent variable = ERRORt [1] [2] [3] [4] 
 
 
  Intercept -0.00132* -0.00111 -0.00038 0.00005 
RYIELDt -0.02659*** -0.02831*** -0.03203*** -0.02850*** 
LOG_MVt 0.00030*** 0.00029*** 0.00023** 0.00018** 
ROAt 0.00153 0.00131 0.00024 -0.00084 
SIGMA_ROAt -0.00367 -0.00301 -0.00033 0.00159 
NOPERt -0.01772* -0.01711* -0.01709 -0.01740 
DEBTt -0.00377*** -0.00362*** -0.00324*** -0.00299*** 
LOSS3 -0.00003    
RYIELDt x LOSS3 0.00894    
LOSS5  -0.00065**   
RYIELDt x LOSS5  0.02088*   
LOSS10   -0.00198***  
RYIELDt x LOSS10   0.03690***  
LOSS    -0.00339*** 
RYIELDt x LOSS    0.05058*** 
     
N 16 16 16 16 
# firms 800 800 800 800 
 
 
 
 
Essay 2 
Does Past Performance of Insider Trading Affect Future Insider Trading Activity? 
 
1. Introduction 
 This paper examines the relation between insider (officers and directors) open 
market transactions and the outcome of past insider trading to better understand what 
motivates insiders to trade. The primary goal of this paper is to test if insider trading 
experiences (as measured by insider trading returns) have any effect on open market 
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purchases made by insiders. If yes, are insiders more sensitive to prior losses than they 
are to prior gains (loss aversion) and to the extent that insiders exhibit loss aversion when 
conducting open market purchases, we examine the economic impact of insider loss 
aversion on insider wealth. 
 There is an extant literature documenting that insiders earn abnormal returns (e.g. 
Lorie and Niederhoffer 1968, Seyhun 1986, Rozeff and Zaman 1988, Lakonishok and 
Lee 2001, and Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser) which can be attributed to insiders’ ability 
to recognize if their firm’s stock is mispriced and also because they are privy to superior 
information about their firm’s future performance. Despite these advantages, insider 
trading is still a risky proposition first because insiders stand to lose wealth if their 
opinion about the intrinsic value of the firm turns out to be wrong. Also insiders tend to 
have a significant amount of their wealth invested in their firm (both financial and human 
capital) and by purchasing additional shares they are de-diversifying their wealth and 
foregoing liquidity.  
We hypothesize that in addition to being influenced by the perceived misvaluation 
of their firm’s securities and having superior information about their firm’s future 
prospects, open market purchases by insiders may also be influenced by gains and losses 
on their existing portfolio of shares held (which would capture the outcome of their past 
open market transactions).  This is consistent with research demonstrating that in a 
variety of contexts decisions under uncertainty can be substantially affected by the 
outcomes of past decisions (see for example, Thaler 1980; Staw 1981; Arkes and Blumer 
1985).  Thaler and Johnson (1990) investigate how prior gains and losses affect risk 
taking behavior and find based on experimental data from Cornell undergraduate and 
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MBA students an increased willingness to take risk after prior gains, which they refer to 
as the “house money effect”.   However, after experiencing a prior loss, individuals 
showed increased loss aversion and reduced willingness to take risk. 
If past gains and losses influence open market purchasing activity, then including 
only recent stock returns and controlling for superior information at the disposal of 
insiders in one’s model may fail to capture this effect.  This is because purchases are not 
made smoothly, and thus the gains and losses on the portfolio are affected both by past 
returns, and the timing of the cash flows used to purchase stock. We begin the empirical 
work by calculating at the firm-level insider trading returns (using the Modified Dietz 
method), and examining their impact on open market purchasing activity. In this 
empirical work, we examine gains and losses separately to allow for the possibility of an 
asymmetric response, which might obtain if insiders exhibit loss aversion (Johnson and 
Thaler, 1990). 
We find insider trading returns to be positively related to insider purchase ratios 
even after controlling for variables previously shown to affect purchasing activity. 
However, this effect seems to be primarily driven by negative insider trading returns as 
conditioning on losses; an increase in insider trading losses is associated with decreased 
insider purchases while given gains from insider trading, an increase in gains has no 
significant effect on insider purchase ratios. Thus the findings suggest that insider loss 
aversion plays a role when insiders conduct open market purchases. We also find that 
loss aversion is more pronounced with directors compared to officers. 
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Finally we examine the economic impact of insider loss aversion by identify a 
subsample of insiders who have losses and are predicted not to purchase due to loss 
aversion. Then we spilt this subsample into two groups (1) one group that acts upon their 
loss aversion by not purchasing and (2) a second group with insiders predicted to be loss 
averse but decide to ignore their loss aversion by actually purchasing. We find that 
having inside information about poor future stock performance and acting on loss 
aversion by not purchasing the firm’s stock today (the first group) helps such insiders to 
avoid an average loss of 5.7% over the next year. On the other hand, having inside 
information about good future stock performance and ignoring to act upon loss aversion 
by actually purchasing the firm’s stock today despite insider trading losses (the second 
group) helps such insiders to earn an average of 8.14% the following year.  
The findings in this study contribute to the literature in several ways. First this 
study helps us better understand why insiders engage in open market purchases. In 
addition to possessing superior information about their firm’s future performance, poor 
timing decreases the intensity of open market purchases made by insiders as they are loss 
averse. Secondly this is the first study to document a link between loss aversion and 
insider trading thus suggesting that insider biases may affect insider trading behavior. 
Finally, the findings in this study confirms the existing literature that insiders have 
superior knowledge about their firm’s future prospect since acting upon loss aversion 
when the firm’s future prospects are less favorable helps insiders avoid a loss and 
ignoring loss aversion in situations of losses but favorable future prospects helps insiders 
enhance their wealth. 
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The study proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature on the 
motives of insider trading and develops the hypothesis. Section 3 describes the data used 
in the study. Section 4 presents the tests of the main hypothesis while section 5 provides 
the economic impact of insider loss aversion on insider wealth. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review and Motivation 
2.1. Determinants of Insider Trading 
This section provides a brief overview of the literature on the determinants of 
insider trading, which we organize into the following broad categories: stock price 
misvaluation, superior information about the firm’s future performance, stock based 
compensation changes, and the demand by institutional and individual investors.  
2.1.1. Stock Price Misvaluation 
There is an extant literature which documents that insiders earn abnormal returns 
(e.g. Lorie and Niederhoffer 1968, Seyhun 1986, Rozeff and Zaman 1988, Lakonishok 
and Lee 2001, and Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser). Such returns can partially be achieved 
if insiders recognize mispricing. According to this motive, insiders would purchase (sell) 
their firm’s security if they believe the security is undervalued (overvalued). In this vein 
Seyhun (1986) shows insider purchases tend to occur after stock price declines and 
insider sell trades tend to occur after stock price rises. 
Similarly Rozeff and Zaman (1998) find evidence suggesting that insiders tend to 
buy undervalued stocks. The authors look at the direction of insider trading with respect 
to growth/value stocks and test if they are consistent with attempts to profit from market 
overreaction (price movements that predictably reverse). Rozeff and Zaman (1998) posit 
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if we assume that value stocks are undervalued and growth stocks are overvalued and /or 
provide profit opportunities to some investor then insiders who supposedly have superior 
information have the incentive to take advantage of such misvaluations within the bounds 
of legality by buying value stock more heavily and /or selling growth stock more heavily. 
But on the other hand, if growth and value stocks don’t meaningfully measure deviations 
of stock prices from fundamental values then insider trades shouldn’t be related to these 
categories. They find that as stocks increasingly move from value stocks to growth stocks 
there is an increase in insider purchasing activity compared to insider selling. Thus 
suggesting that the price of value stocks tend to be below intrinsic value while that of 
growth stocks above intrinsic value. They also find an increase in insider buying (selling) 
following low stock returns (high stock returns). 
In the same vein, Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) find insiders to be contrarian 
specifically, they find a positive relationship between insider trading (purchases) and the 
firm’s book-to-market value and a negative relationship between insider trading and 
recent stock returns. Both of these variables are used as measures of undervaluation. 
Similarly, Jenter (2005) finds insiders’ perceived misvaluation of their stock is a motive 
for insider trading (insider purchasing is increasing in firms with low market-to-book 
values). 
2.1.2. Superior Information about Firm’s Future Performance 
In addition to recognizing mispricing, it has been documented that insiders’ 
abnormal returns from trading their firms’ stock can be attributed to having an 
informational advantage about the firm’s future performance (cash flow realizations and 
future earnings innovations). Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) use next year’s annual 
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earnings innovation and next year’s market-adjusted stock returns as measures of future 
unexpected cash flow changes unknown by the market but known by insiders. The 
authors find a positive relationship between these proxy variables and insiders’ open 
market purchasing activity. Similarly, Ke, Huddart, and Petroni (2003) examine insider-
trading patterns ahead of a break in quarterly earnings increases and find insider sales 
increase three to nine quarters before the earnings break. They use this as evidence 
suggesting that insiders trade ahead of earnings breaks, and avoid abnormal selling two 
quarters prior to the break to avoid potential legal issues. 
2.1.3. Stock Based Compensation Changes 
Ofek and Yermack (2000) show that insider trading is influenced by the changes 
in insider holdings due to stock and option grants and the exercising of stock options (For 
example, increased equity compensation to higher-ownership managers leads to the sale 
of previously owned shares). To this extent, Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) find an 
inverse relationship between insider purchasing activity and number of shares of 
restricted stock and stock options granted and number of stock options exercised.  
2.1.4. Demand by Institutional and Individual Investors  
Sias and Whidbee (2010) examine the relationship between insider trading and 
institutional and individual investors as a motive for insider trading. The authors 
hypothesize and find a negative association between inside trading and institutional 
demand and offer three possible explanations. First, since insider trades are usually large, 
institutional investors are more likely to provide the liquidity necessary for insiders to 
trade. Secondly, institutional investors are attracted to firms with high valuations and 
high recent stock return while insiders are attracted to the opposite. Finally, since insiders 
56 
 
 
 
are more likely to view their securities as overvalued (undervalued) following a period 
when institutions were net buyers (sellers) insiders will trade in the opposite direction of 
institutional investors. 
2.2. The Effect of Insider Trading Returns (Gain and Losses) on Risk Taking Behavior 
The literature discussed above captures what we will label “rational” motivations 
for insider trading.  By rational we simply mean that in each of the cited papers, insider 
trading is conducted to benefit the insider in some way by increasing their wealth. 
There is an extant literature documenting that insiders earn abnormal returns (e.g. 
Lorie and Niederhoffer 1968, Seyhun 1986, Rozeff and Zaman 1988, Lakonishok and 
Lee 2001, and Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser) which can be attributed to insiders’ ability 
to recognize if their firm’s stock is mispriced and also because they are privy to superior 
information about their firm’s future performance. Despite these advantages insider 
trading is still a risky proposition first because insiders stand to lose wealth if their 
opinion about the intrinsic value of the firm turns out to be wrong. Also insiders tend to 
have a significant amount of their wealth invested in their firm (both financial and human 
capital) and by purchasing additional shares they are de-diversifying their wealth and 
foregoing liquidity.  
There is also a line of research suggesting investment decisions may be influenced 
by past returns.  For instance, Ippolito (1992) shows inflows to mutual funds are strongly 
correlated with past fund performance.   Empirical work by Friesen and Sapp (2007), 
Frazzini and Lamont (2008) and Dichev (2007) indicates that poor investment-timing 
decisions, in which investors buy after past gains and sell after past losses, destroy a 
significant percentage of investor wealth.   
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We hypothesize that in addition to being influenced by the perceived misvaluation 
of their firm’s securities and having superior information about their firm’s future 
prospects, open market purchases by insiders may also be influenced by gains and losses 
on their existing portfolio of shares held (which would capture the outcome of their past 
open market transactions).  This is consistent with research demonstrating that in a 
variety of contexts decisions under uncertainty can be substantially affected by the 
outcomes of past decisions (see for example, Thaler 1980; Staw 1981; Arkes and Blumer 
1985).  Thaler and Johnson (1990) investigate how prior gains and losses affect risk 
taking behavior and find based on experimental data from Cornell undergraduate and 
MBA students an increased willingness to take risk after prior gains, which they refer to 
as the “house money effect”. However, after experiencing a prior loss, individuals 
showed increased loss aversion, a phenomenon sometimes referred to as the “snakebite 
effect”.  Their results suggest that losses are more painful if they happen after prior losses 
and less painful if they occur after prior gains, since prior gains act as cushions for future 
losses.  Frino, Grant and Johnstone (2007) examine Australian futures traders and find 
supporting evidence, that traders take on more risk in the afternoon on days with morning 
gains.  Low (2004) finds that prior losses are associated with increased loss aversion, 
which is consistent with the snakebite effect.   However, the evidence on the effect of 
past gains and losses is mixed.  Coval and Shumway (2005) find that traders with 
morning losses increase risk-taking in the afternoon. 
Regardless of the precise nature of the relationship, if past gains and losses 
influence open market purchasing activity, then including only recent stock returns and 
controlling for superior information at the disposal of insiders in one’s model may fail to 
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capture this effect.  This is because purchases are not made smoothly, and thus the gains 
and losses on the portfolio are affected both by past returns, and the timing of the cash 
flows used to purchase stock. We begin the empirical work by calculating at the firm-
level insider trading returns, and examining their purchasing activity. In this empirical 
work, we examine gains and losses separately to allow for the possibility of an 
asymmetric response, which might obtain if insiders exhibit loss aversion (Johnson and 
Thaler, 1990). 
Finally, to the extent that insiders exhibit loss aversion when conducting open 
market purchases, we examine the economic impact of insider loss aversion on insider 
wealth. 
 
3. Data and Sample Construction 
The analysis in this study focuses on open market purchases and sales by directors 
and officers from Table 2 of Thomson Reuters (TFN) spanning 1986 to 2012. We impose 
the following screens on table 2 data:  delete amendments and some cleansed 
observations9; keep transaction codes P and S as they are open market or private purchase 
and sales; ignore sales that are related to the exercise of an option10; and we keep 
transactions in firms for which we have COMPUSTAT and CRSP necessary to generate 
                                                           
9
 Thomson advises Cleanse Code (A) to be avoided from analysis. And also code (S) since data with a 
cleanse code of 'S' have a different security from the one they have been entered under 
10
 The variable optionSell: Identifies a sale that is related to the exercise of options. Possible values include 
all (A), partial (P), none (N), or blank. We want open market sale of shares that were purchased for their 
account and not those that arose from option grants so we keep (N) and ignore (A) and (P) and Blanks 
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control variables. This results in 1,682,374 transactions over 27 years of which 442,882 
(26%) are purchases and 1,239,492 (74%) are sales with 124,009 insiders11.  
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on the number of shares purchased and sold; 
transaction values; and shares held after each transaction. The typical number of shares 
purchased is larger than the number of shares sold (with an average of 19,701 shares 
versus 16,650) however; the typical dollar transaction value for purchases is smaller than 
the sales value (with an average dollar value of $140,131 per purchase versus $469,564 
per sale). 
Table 2 reports the distribution and frequencies of insider transactions. From table 
two, 61 percent of insiders (76,026 insiders out 124,009) have one or zero purchase 
transactions which is similar for sales (76,159 insiders out of 124,009). From panel B of 
table 2, the average number of purchase transactions made by an insider is 4 compared to 
10 for sales. 
3.1. Measurement of Insider Trading Behavior 
Following Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) we measure insider trading as the 
firm’s purchase ratio defined as follows: 
, 
QRS7,8
QRS7,8<T>UU7,8
 ,            eq.1 
where V',("",) is the number of shared purchased (sold) by insiders (officers and 
directors) of the i'th firm in year t. 
                                                           
11
 Some individuals are insiders in more than 1 firm. This number is the sum of insiders in any given firm 
and thus allows for some individuals to show up multiple times if they are insiders in more than 1 firm. 
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3.2. Measurement of Insider Trading returns  
The primary goal of this paper is to test if the outcome of past insider trading 
(insider trading experience) as measure by insider trading returns (InsiderRett) have any 
effect on open market insider purchases. If yes, are insiders more sensitive to prior losses 
than they are to prior gains. The main variable, InsiderRett is constructed as follows: 
K-IW(*(,, 
X?A AY Z[ Y\Y@A?] []Z^_
`6Y@?aYb?c?]
 FG;FGdbe
FGd<∑ ^7gbe7
h
7i;
                         eq. 2 
Where: 
• # is the end of year market value of the portfolio of all shares held by insiders 
in the i’th firm. Computed as the number of shares held by all insiders at the end 
of the year multiplied by the closing stock price of the year. 
• #j is the beginning of year market value of the portfolio of all shares held by 
insiders in the i’th firm. Computed as the number of shares held by all insiders at 
the beginning of the year multiplied by the opening stock price of the year. 
•  is the net external inflows over year t made by insiders of the i'th firm. It is 
computed as total dollars spent on purchases minus the total dollars received from 
sales (Note contributions to portfolio are positive inflows and withdrawals form 
portfolio are negative flows) 
• ∑ k g 
A
l  is the sum each cash flow multiplied by its weight: 
o k 
b557
b5
                                  eq.3 
o  H is the number of calendar days during the return period being 
calculated (we use 365) 
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o H is the number of days from the start of the return period until the day on 
which the flow  occurred. For example, if a purchase occurs on 
January 31 then it is 31 days,  if on February 2nd then it is 33 days. 
The above return, K-IW(*(,, is the Modified Dietz (see Dietz 1966) return and 
is an approximation of the IRR (the true dollar weighted return)12. The modified Dietz 
return has the advantage of having a closed form solution versus the IRR which requires 
numerical methods. Our choice of the Modified Dietz over the IRR is motivated by 
following reasons. First when computing the IRRs we had a convergence rate of about 
70% thus we lose a significant amount of data. Secondly, in most cases we have more 
than one IRR due to the sign switches in the cash flows. In such cases the SAS IRR 
function reports one IRR and we are not sure which of the IRRs is reported. Even if we 
knew all the IRRs it is not sure which one of then we would use. This issue is 
exacerbated the more trades we have and/or the longer the period over which the IRR is 
computed. Finally, computing the “true” IRR requires that we have the correct initial 
value of an insider’s portfolio but TFN begins in 1986 thus for some insiders we do not 
have their actual initial portfolio value. But with the Modified Dietz we need the 
beginning and ending value of the portfolio over the period for which we are computing 
the return. 
A potential issue with the Modified Dietz return (K-IW(*(,,) in this study is 
that some of the shares held in the insiders’ portfolio may have resulted from other 
sources than open market purchases especially from the exercise of options. To control 
                                                           
12
 The Modified Dietz return assumes simple rate of interest and approximates the IRR which uses 
compounding principle. If the cash flows and rates of return are large enough, Modified Dietz would yield 
significantly different returns compared to the IRR. 
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for this we ignore sales that are related to the exercise of an option13.  This may just take 
care of cases where the options are sold immediately and may not capture options that are 
exercised and sold at a later date (either because the insider has some insider information 
or the shares are held for some mechanical reason). We argue that such transactions will 
not bias the results in this study. First if the insider holds on to the shares because they 
have some inside information then they are making a conscious decision to increase their 
insider trading return. Secondly if they hold the shares for some mechanical reason we 
posit that such transactions are timing neutral and while they may add noise to results 
they will not bias the results. Finally, the number of such transactions should be small as 
Ofek and Yermack (2000) estimate that when executives exercise options to acquire 
stock, they keep almost none of the shares (see page 1376). Similarly Huddart, and Lang 
(1996) hold that while their data doesn’t detail the ultimate disposition of options in their 
sample, the authors’ discussions with the data providers suggests that employees do not 
keep the shares acquired on exercise (page 19). 
 Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser (2003) attempt to measure insiders actual return by 
creating a purchase (sale) value-weighted portfolio of all insiders for the duration of 6 
months since the purchase (sale). However, they do not exactly measure what insiders 
earn for several reasons: they only measure returns over a holding of 6 months, and they 
do not account for subsequent trades that insiders may execute.  
3.3. Control Variables 
                                                           
13
 TFN has a variable called optionSell which dentifies a sale that is related to the exercise of options. 
Possible values include all (A), partial (P), none (N), or blank. We want open market sale of shares that 
were purchased for their account and not those that arose from option grants so we keep (N) and ignore (A) 
and (P) and Blanks 
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In addition to insider trading data we collect a set of control variables used by 
Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) to explain insider purchasing activity. This allows us to 
compare our results to previous studies (e.g. Rozeff and Zaman 1988, and Sias and 
Whidbee 2010). We require securities to have Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) variables 
to be included in our sample. The following control variables are used in the study 
• Measurements of future firm performance: 
o GoodRet(t+1) : Is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the stock’s next year’s 
market adjusted return (MaRet(t+1)) is greater than zero else equal to zero. 
This is a measure of the firm’s future performance and measures the 
insiders’ potential gain from trading the firm’s stock as opposed to the 
market portfolio. To the extent that insiders have superior knowledge 
about information influencing future returns, it should be positively related 
to insider purchases. Stock return data are from CRSP. 
o GoodRoA(t+1) : Is an indicator variable equal to one if next year’s change 
in ROA (∆ROA(t+1)) is greater than zero else equals to zero. This is also a 
measure of the firm’s future performance (next year’s earnings 
innovations) and it is expected to be positively related to insider 
purchases. Where ∆ROA(t+1) is the next year’s first difference in Return-
on-Assets (ROA(t+1) - ROA(t)) and ROA is COMPUSTAT’s Income before 
Extraordinary items (IB) scaled by COMPUSTAT’s total assets (AT) 
o GoodRoA(t) : Is an indicator variable equal to one if the current year’s 
change in ROA (∆ROA(t))  is greater than zero else equals to zero. 
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• Measurements of undervaluation : 
o BM1t to BM4t : Is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the book-to-market 
(BM) ratio is in the i’th quintile of year t’s BM distribution (e.g. 
BM1=glamour firms). Where the BM is measured as the firm’s book 
value of shareholders equity (COMPUSTAT’s CEQ) at the end of year 
scaled by the market value of equity at the end of year t (COMPUSTAT’s 
CSHO multiplied by the stock’s closing stock price at the end of year from 
CRSP). 
o HRet and Mret: Is an indicator variable equal to 1 if market adjusted stock 
return is in the high trecile and middle trecile respectively of year t’s 
distribution of realized market adjusted returns.  
Table three presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study pooled 
over all firm-year observations. Although our sample is longer than Piotroski and 
Roulstone (2005) and Sias and Whidbee (2010) the descriptive statistics are close. The 
last six rows in table three report descriptive statistics of the insider trading returns for all 
insiders, directors only and officers only. From table three officers’ returns are on 
average bigger than those of directors. Also about 59% of the time insiders have losses. 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
In this section we examine the impact of insider trading returns on open market 
purchasing activity. In the empirical framework, we examine gains and losses separately 
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to allow for the possibility of an asymmetric response, which might obtain if insiders 
exhibit loss aversion. We start the analysis by examining the relation between insiders 
purchase ratios (,) and insider trading returns (K-IW(*(,,). Next, given that the 
board of directors is a governing body and meets periodically it follows that officers are 
more likely to have superior and timely information about the firm’s future performance. 
We test for equality of loss aversion across directors and officers. Finally, we examine 
the relationship between insider trading returns and the decision to conduct open market 
purchases.  
4.1. The Relation between Insider Purchase Ratios and Insider Returns - All insiders 
To test whether there is a relation between insider purchase ratios and insider 
returns  we utilize the methodology in Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) and augment their 
variables with our insider trading returns variable (K-IW(*(,,). Rozeff and Zaman 
(1988), and Sias and Whidbee (2010) utilize a similar methodology. We restrict 
transactions to open market transactions and do not include firm-years where insiders do 
not engage in open market transaction. Specifically, we estimate coefficients annually 
from the following cross-sectional model: 
,  m  L22W ,<   L22W%,<   L22W%,   1, 
 2,   !3,   $4,   / ,   0 ,   jK-IW(*(,, 
 q,                 eq.4 
 To control for cross-sectional dependencies, the model is estimated annually and 
the average annual coefficients are tested against the null of zero using standard errors 
from the empirically derived distribution of the annual coefficients. Average coefficients 
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are presented in panel A of table four. For robustness we estimate fixed effects regression 
(with firm fixed effects and year effects) in panel B. 
 To test for insider loss aversion we estimate equation 5 by augmenting equation 4 
with two variables: (1) LossDummyi,t, an indicator which equals one if InsiderReti,t is 
negative and zero if positive; and (2) an interaction variable K-IW(*(,, g
"2--HrssI,,: 
,  m  L22W ,<   L22W%,<   L22W%,   1, 
 2,   !3,   $4,   / ,   0 ,   jK-IW(*(,, 
"2--Hrss,  K-IW(*(,, g "2--Hrss,    q,        eq.5 
If insiders are more sensitive to prior losses than prior gains when conducting 
open market purchases then, the coefficient on K-IW(*(,, g "2--Hrss,, β12 will 
be positive and significant14. Just as with equation 4, this model is estimated annually and 
the average annual coefficients are tested against the null of zero using standard errors 
from the empirically derived distribution of the annual coefficients. Average coefficients 
are presented in panel A of table four. For robustness we estimate fixed effects regression 
(with firm fixed effects and year effects) in panel B. 
Table four shows that the prior determinants of insider purchases have their 
expected signs and are statistically significant at an alpha level of 1% but 
                                                           
14 The regression model presented in equation 5 is a piecewise linear model since holding all other variables 
constant, the coefficient on K-IW(*(,,captures the slope in the region of positive insider returns (gains) 
while the coefficient on the interaction term K-IW(*(,, g "2--Hrss, plus that of K-IW(*(,, is 
the slope in the region of negative insider returns (losses). Hence the coefficient on K-IW(*(,, g
"2--Hrss, is a kink at the origin and if positive results in a steeper slope in the domain of losses. 
However, the coefficient on "2--Hrss, captures a discontinuity at the origin or kink and we do not 
provide an economic interpretation of that parameter.  
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for L22W%,. Insider purchase ratios are positively related to the firm’s future 
performance measures (L22W ,<, and L22W2,<) thus suggesting insiders have 
superior knowledge about information influencing future returns and earnings 
innovations and take advantage of it. Also insiders tend to purchase shares when the 
firm’s shares are undervalued as there is (1) a negative relationship between insider 
purchase ratios and the book-to-market quintiles and the magnitude of the book-to-
market quintiles decrease monotonically as we move from high book-to-market quintiles 
to lower quintiles. (2) there is also a negative relationship between insider purchase ratios 
and the market-adjusted stock return treciles and the magnitude of the coefficients also 
decreases monotonically as we move from the high trecile to the medium trecile. 
The second models in both panels of table four documents a positive relationship 
between insider purchase ratios and insider returns. This would suggest that insiders 
purchase more of their firm’s shares if they have positive experiences from insider 
trading.  The third models in both panels of table four shows that conditioning on losses; 
an increase in insider trading losses is associated with decreased insider purchases. On 
the other hand, given gains from insider trading, an increase in gains has no significant 
effect on insider purchase ratios. Taken together the results suggests that insider trading 
returns are positively related to the intensity of insider purchases, this effect seems to be 
primarily driven by negative insider trading returns and suggest that insiders are loss 
averse. 
4.2. The Relation between Insider Purchase Ratios and Insider Returns – Officers versus 
Directors 
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The previous analysis combines officers and directors and implicitly assumes that 
officers and directors have access to similar information. Given that the board of directors 
is a monitoring body and meet periodically it is possible that officers have access to 
better performance related information and in a timelier manner than directors. Piotroski 
and Roulstone (2005) provide evidence confirming this by documenting that the 
magnitude of the coefficient on L22W%,<is larger in magnitude for executives than 
directors. In the same vein, Enrichetta and Sapienza (2010) compare the returns to insider 
purchases (sales) of executives to that of independent directors to examine whether 
directors are informed of the firm. The authors find while both executives and 
independent directors in the same firm earn positive substantial abnormal returns, 
executives have slightly higher returns. 
Thus in this section, we test which of the two groups of insiders (directors or 
officers) are more loss averse. Since officers are likely to have timelier information and 
presumably better quality information than directors one could expect directors to be 
more loss averse. On the other hand, officers could be more loss averse if they suffer 
from myopic loss aversion a la Bernatzi and Thaler (1995). Myopic loss aversion occurs 
when an investor computes gains and losses at more frequent intervals. Given that 
officers spend more time at the firm and are privy to information in a timelier manner 
they could suffer from myopic loss aversion if this causes them to trade more frequently 
than directors who meet periodically. Thus which group of insiders is more loss averse is 
an empirical issue that we address by re-estimating equation 5 for directors-only and 
officers-only and comparing the coefficients on K-IW(*(,, g "2--Hrss,, in table 
five. 
69 
 
 
 
Models three and four of panels A and B of table five has the results for officers-
only and directors-only respectively. The analysis shows that both groups are loss averse 
however loss aversion is more pronounced with the directors compared to officers. For 
example, panel A has a coefficient estimate of 0.0079 on 
 K-IW(*(,, g "2--Hrss,for the officer-only sample versus 0.0107 for the 
director-only sample and the difference is statistically significant at an alpha level of 1%. 
4.3. The Relation between Insider Returns and the Decision to Purchase 
The previous sections established a relationship between insider returns and the 
level of insider purchases (insiders purchase ratios). We did not include firm-years where 
insiders did not engage in open market transactions thus the results thus far are predicated 
on insiders deciding to purchase. As a result, omission of no-trade firm-years ignores 
potential useful information about the decision to purchase. In this section we examine 
the relationship between insider trading returns and the decision to conduct open market 
purchases with the following conditional firm fixed effects logit model with year effects: 
r*t)-(,  1uv,, .D 
L22W ,<   L22W%,<  L22W%,   1,  2, 
 !3,   $4,   / ,   0 ,  jK-IW(*(,, 
 "2--Hrss,  K-IW(*(,, g "2--Hrss,  ()*++(,-       eq.6 
 The dependent variable, r*t)-(, is an indicator variable that equals one if 
shares are purchased in year t else it is equal to zero. The results of the logit analysis are 
in table six and are consistent with the findings in the preceding sections. The prior 
determinants of insider purchases have their expected signs and are statistically 
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significant at an alpha level of 1% but for L22W%,. The decision to purchase shares is 
positively related to the firm’s future performance measures (L22W ,<, and 
L22W2,<). Also, insiders tend to purchase shares when the firm’s shares are 
undervalued as there is as there is a negative relationship between the decision to 
purchase shares and (1) the book-to-market quintiles and (2) the market-adjusted stock 
return treciles. 
The second model in table six documents a positive relationship between the 
decision to purchase shares and insider returns. Thus suggesting that insiders tend to 
purchase their firm’s shares when they have positive experiences from insider trading.  
The third model of table six shows that conditioning on losses; an increase in insider 
trading losses is associated with lower probability of insider purchasing. Likewise, given 
gains from insider trading, an increase in gains is also associated with a higher 
probability of purchasing. However there is still evidence of loss aversion as the decision 
to purchase is more sensitive to insider losses compared to gains. 
 
5. Implication: The Economic Impact of Loss Aversion 
 In the preceding section we document that insider returns are positively related to 
insider purchasing activity and that insiders are loss averse. In this section we examine 
the economic impact of insider loss aversion, specifically if loss aversion benefits or hurts 
insider wealth. We use two approaches. The first approach is to identify a subsample of 
insiders who have losses and are predicted not to purchase due to loss aversion. Then we 
spilt this subsample into a group that acts upon their loss aversion by not purchasing and 
71 
 
 
 
a second group that are supposedly loss averse but decide to ignore their loss aversion by 
actually purchasing. Then we compare the returns of both groups. The second approach 
uses a mixed logistic model to get firm specific loss aversion coefficients and forming 
quartiles based on these coefficients to test the market timing ability. 
5.1. Being Loss Averse and Acting upon it versus Being Loss Averse and ignoring it 
In this section we examine the economic impact of loss aversion on the wealth of 
insiders by: 
• Step 1: First identify a subsample of insiders who have losses and are predicted 
not to purchase due to loss aversion.  
• Step 2: Split this subsample into a group that acts upon their loss aversion by not 
purchasing and a second group that are supposedly loss averse but decide to 
ignore their loss aversion by purchasing.  
• Step 3: compare the returns of both groups 
To identify a subsample of insiders who have losses and are predicted not to 
purchase due to loss aversion, we estimate two specifications of the the logit model in 
equation 6 as follows: 
r*t)-(,  1uv,, .D 
L22W ,<   L22W%,<  L22W%,   1,  2, 
 !3,   $4,   / ,   0 ,  ()*++(,-        eq.7 
r*t)-(,  1uv,, .D 
L22W ,<   L22W%,<  L22W%,   1,  2, 
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!3,   $4,   / ,   0 ,  jK-IW(*(,, 
 "2--Hrss,  K-IW(*(,, g "2--Hrss,  ()*++(,-      eq.8 
In equation 7 we estimate the probability of purchasing without controlling for insider 
returns and loss aversion and save the predicted probabilities of purchasing. Next in 
equation 8 we augment equation 7 by controlling for insider returns and loss aversion and 
save the predicted probabilities of purchasing. Next we keep firm year observations with: 
(1) losses, (2) whose probability of purchasing decreases once we control for loss 
aversion in equation 8 and (3) they are predicted not to purchase15. We argue that the 
reason these observations have a decreased probability of purchasing and are predicted 
not to purchase is because they have losses and are loss averse. This results in 8,730 firm-
year observations. Then we split this subsample into two groups (1) one group that 
actually does not purchase which results in 3,720 firm year observations (2) a second 
group that actually purchases which results in 5,010 firm year observations. The idea is 
that both groups are loss averse and are predicted not to purchase due to their loss 
aversion but one group actually acts upon their loss aversion by actually not purchasing 
and the other group despite being loss averse and predicted not to purchase ignores the 
loss aversion by actually purchasing. Next we compare the mean insider trading returns 
and next year’s market adjusted stock return for both groups; the results are in table 7. 
Table 7 shows that both groups have insider trading losses but those that act upon 
their loss aversion are worse off (mean K-IW(*(,  of -10.0501% versus -6.7995%). 
The key finding is with next year’s mean market-adjusted stock return 
                                                           
15
 The cut off probability of purchasing used is 0.69 which represents the unconditional probability of 
purchasing since 33,983 firm-year observations have purchases out of 49,159. 
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(x,Wy,2x(,<). Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) hold next year’s market adjusted 
stock return is a measure of the firm’s future performance and measures insiders’ 
potential gain from trading the firm’s stock as opposed to the market portfolio. Thus 
having inside information about poor future stock performance and acting on loss 
aversion by not purchasing the firm’s stock today helps such insiders to avoid an average 
loss of 5.7% over the next year. On the other hand, having inside information about good 
future stock performance and ignoring to act upon loss aversion by actually purchasing 
the firm’s stock today despite insider trading losses helps insider to earn an average of 
8.14% the following year. This finding also confirms the existing literature that insiders 
have superior knowledge about their firm’s future prospect since acting upon loss 
aversion when the firms future prospects are less favorable helps insiders avoid a loss and 
ignoring loss aversion in situations of losses but favorable future prospects helps insiders. 
 5.2. Firm Specific Loss Aversion Coefficients and Insider Market Timing Ability 
Another approach we use to access the economic impact of insider loss aversion 
is to: 
• use the following mixed logistic model to get firm specific coefficients of 
sensitivity to losses from insider trading: 
r*t)-(,  1uv,, .D  L22W ,<  L22W%,< 
 L22W%,   1,   2,   !3,   $4, 
 / ,   0 ,   jK-IW(*(,,   "2--Hrss, 
  zK-IW(*(,, g "2--Hrss,  ()*++(,- ,                  eq.9 
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Where  is the average effect of losses which is the same for all firms and z is 
the effect of losses that is unique to the i’th firm. Thus   z is the i'th firm’s 
sensitivity to past losses; if positive this is consistent with loss aversion and if 
negative it is consistent with risk seeking. 
• For each firm year observation we take the difference between that year’s dollar 
weighted return (we use K-IW(*(,, is our proxy) and time weighted return (we 
use that year’s stock return). If insiders are good at timing then this difference is 
expected to be positive and negative if they exhibit poor timing 
• Then we form quartiles based on the loss sensitivities16generate by the mixed 
model and get the mean of the difference between K-IW(*(,, and 
KKr){(,, in each quartile. The first quartile has the least loss averse insiders 
and the forth quartile has the most loss averse. If loss aversion is costly then we 
expect the average difference between K-IW(*(,, and KKr){(,, in the 
fourth quartile to be negative and that of the first quartile to be positive. 
Table eight presents the results of the average difference between K-IW(*(,, and 
KKr){(,, across all four quartile. The results show that the most loss averse insiders 
on average tend to exhibit poor timing thus suggesting that loss aversion can be costly. 
To reconcile the findings in this subsection with that of the preceding subsection, 
the results from this subsection suggests that at high levels, loss aversion can destroy 
wealth. However, the finding in the preceding subsection suggests that loss aversion can 
                                                           
16
 500 out of 7,900 have negative loss coefficient thus are not loss averse but are risk seeking. These 500 
firms are not included in the analysis 
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help insiders avoid future losses if they have information about looming unfavorable 
prospects with their firms.  
 
6. Conclusion 
There is an extant literature documenting that insiders earn abnormal returns (e.g. 
Lorie and Niederhoffer 1968, Seyhun 1986, Rozeff and Zaman 1988, Lakonishok and 
Lee 2001, and Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser) which can be attributed to insiders’ ability 
to recognize if their firm’s stock is mispriced and also because they are privy to superior 
information about their firm’s future performance. Despite these advantages, insider 
trading is still a risky proposition first because insiders stand to lose wealth if their 
opinion about the intrinsic value of the firm turns out to be wrong. Also insiders tend to 
have a significant amount of their wealth invested in their firm (both financial and human 
capital) and by purchasing additional shares they are de-diversifying their wealth and 
foregoing liquidity.  
We hypothesize that in addition to being influenced by the perceived misvaluation 
of their firm’s securities and having superior information about their firm’s future 
prospects, open market purchases by insiders may also be influenced by gains and losses 
on their existing portfolio of shares held (which would capture the outcome of their past 
open market transactions).  This is consistent with research demonstrating that in a 
variety of contexts decisions under uncertainty can be substantially affected by the 
outcomes of past decisions (see for example, Thaler 1980; Staw 1981; Arkes and Blumer 
1985).  Thaler and Johnson (1990) investigate how prior gains and losses affect risk 
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taking behavior and find based on experimental data from Cornell undergraduate and 
MBA students an increased willingness to take risk after prior gains, which they refer to 
as the “house money effect”.   However, after experiencing a prior loss, individuals 
showed increased loss aversion and reduced willingness to take risk. 
We begin the empirical work by calculating at the firm-level insider trading 
returns, and examining their impact on open market purchasing activity. In this empirical 
work, we examine gains and losses separately to allow for the possibility of an 
asymmetric response, which might obtain if insiders exhibit loss aversion (Johnson and 
Thaler, 1990). 
We find insider trading returns to be positively related to insider purchase ratios 
even after controlling for variables previously shown to affect purchasing activity. 
However, this effect seems to be primarily driven by negative insider trading returns as 
conditioning on losses; an increase in insider trading losses is associated with decreased 
insider purchases while given gains from insider trading, an increase in gains has no 
significant effect on insider purchase ratios. Thus suggesting that insider loss aversion 
plays a role when insiders conduct open market purchases. We also find that loss 
aversion is more pronounced with the directors compared to officers. 
Finally we examine the economic impact of insider loss aversion by identify a 
subsample of insiders who have losses and are predicted not to purchase due to loss 
aversion. Then we spilt this subsample into a group that acts upon their loss aversion by 
not purchasing and a second group that are predicted to be loss averse but decide to 
ignore their loss aversion by actually purchasing. Then we compare the returns of both 
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groups. We find that having inside information about poor future stock performance and 
acting on loss aversion by not purchasing the firm’s stock today helps such insiders to 
avoid an average loss of 5.7% over the next year. On the other hand, having inside 
information about good future stock performance and ignoring to act upon loss aversion 
by actually purchasing the firm’s stock today despite insider trading losses helps insiders 
to earn an average of 8.14% the following year. This confirms the existing literature that 
insiders have superior knowledge about their firm’s future prospect since acting upon loss 
aversion when the firms future prospects are less favorable helps insiders avoid a loss and 
ignoring loss aversion in situations of losses but favorable future prospects helps insiders 
enhance their wealth. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistic by Transaction Type 
This table reports descriptive statistics on the number of shares purchased, the number of shares sold, 
purchase transaction value, sales transaction value and the resulting number of shares held after a 
transaction. 
Variable Mean Std 5% 25% 50% 75% 99% 
# Shares 
Purchased
 
19,701 1,295,999 32 300 1,000 4,000 25,000 
# Shares Sold
 
16,650 578,835 55 200 800 3,800 30,000 
Purchase 
Transaction 
Value
 
$140,131 $5,634,479 $320 $2,595 $9,500 $32,000 $228,750 
Sale Transaction 
Value
 
$469,564 $21,072,430 $1,428 $6,275 $22,345 $92,951 $851,840 
Resulting Shares 
Held
 
2,290,197 69,945,542 612 7,776 43,227 295,000 3,821,240 
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Table 2 
Distribution and Frequency of Transactions 
This table provides the distribution and frequencies of insider transactions at the individual level. Panel A 
has the number of insiders with zero, 1, 2, 3 to 5, 6 to 10, 11 to 20 and  more than 21  purchase and sales 
transaction along with their corresponding percentages. Panel B has the minimum number of transactions 
made by an insider, with the maximum, mean, 5th percentile, 25th percentile, median, 75th percentile and 
99th percentile. 
Panel A: Number of Transactions - Frequency  
Variable Purchase Transactions Sale Transactions 
 Number of Insiders % of Insiders Number of Insiders % of Insiders 
Zero Transactions
 
44,514 36% 56,240 45% 
1 Transaction
 
31,512 25% 19,919 16% 
2 Transactions
 
13,891 11% 10,207 8% 
3 to 5 Transactions
 
16,622 13% 13,949 11% 
6 to 10 Transactions
 
8,966 7% 8,910 7% 
11 to 20 Transactions1 4,936 4% 6,510 5% 
More than 21 Transactions
 
3,568 3% 8,274 7% 
     
 
Panel B: Number of Transactions – Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Min Max Mean 5% 25% 50% 75% 99% 
Individual Purchases 0 2,770 4 0 0 1 3 14 
Individual Sales
 
0 48,889 10 0 0 1 4 17 
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Table 3 
Summary Statistics 
This table provides summary statistics for variables used in the study. The sample period is 1986-2012. 
PR_All Insiderst is the purchase ratio of all insiders (directors and officers) in year t, computed as the 
number of shares purchased by all insiders divided by the number of shares purchased and sold by all 
insiders. PR_Officerst and PR_Directorst are the purchases ratios for officers-only and directors only 
respectively in year t. BMt is the book-to-market ratio in year t defined as the book value of equity 
(COMPUSTAT: CEQ) scaled by MVEt. MVEt  is the market value of equity  at the end of year t defined as 
common shares outstanding at the end of year t multiplied by the closing stock  price of the year 
(COMPUSTAT: CSHO multiplied by the stock’s closing stock price at the end of year from CRSP). 
MARet(t+1) is next year’s market-adjusted stock return measured as the firm’s 12-month cumulative return in 
year t+1 minus the corresponding12-month return on the valued weighted index. ROA(t+1)  is the return on 
asset for year t+1 measured as income before extraordinary items (COMPUSTAT: IB) scaled by total 
assets (COMPUSTAT: AT). ∆ROA(t+1) is next year’s first difference in ROA measures as ROA in year t+1 
minus ROA in year t. InsiderRett is the Modified Dietz return on the portfolio of the firm’s shares held by 
all insiders (director and officers) computed over year t; it is our measure of insider trading returns. Insider-
lossDummyt is an indicator which equals one if InsiderRett is negative and zero if positive. DirectorsRett 
and OfficersRett are the insider returns for directors-only and officers-only. Directors-lossDummyt and   
Officers-lossDummyt are indicator variables if DirectorsRett and OfficersRett are respectively negative and 
zero if positive. 
Variable Mean Std 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% 
PR_All Insiderst 0.462 0.452 0.000 0.000 0.296 1.000 1.000 
PR_Officerst 0.433 0.470 0.000 0.000 0.087 1.000 1.000 
PR_Directorst 0.523 0.468 0.000 0.000 0.613 1.000 1.000 
BMt 0.637 3.785 0.063 0.279 0.502 0.815 1.790 
MVEt 2,752 310,303 11.5 65.9 261.1 1,048.6 9,593.1 
MARet(t+1) 0.065 0.983 -0.740 -0.326 -0.053 0.242 1.116 
ROA(t+1) -0.058 0.929 -0.515 -0.019 0.018 0.063 0.148 
∆ROA(t+1) -0.021 0.926 -0.262 -0.029 0.000 0.019 0.203 
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InsiderRett 0.112 1.980 -0.996 -0.090 -0.028 0.089 1.613 
Insider - lossDummyt 0.587 0.492 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
DirectorsRett 0.086 1.431 -0.577 -0.083 -0.018 0.053 1.039 
Directors - lossDummyt 0.578 0.494 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
OfficersRett 0.107 1.566 -0.713 -0.079 -0.012 0.067 1.234 
Officers - lossDummyt 0.557 0.497 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
The Impact of Insider Returns on the Purchase Ratios  
This table presents multivariate regressions to assess the relation between insider trading returns and 
purchase ratios. The dependent variable is PRt is the purchase ratio of all insiders (directors and officers) in 
year t, computed as the number of shares purchased by all insiders divided by the number of shares 
purchased and sold by all insiders. Panel A uses Fama-MacBeth regressions where the model is estimated 
annually and the average annual coefficients are tested against the null of zero using standard errors from 
the empirically derived distribution of the annual coefficients. Average coefficients are presented in panel 
A. Panel B employs fixed effects regressions with firm and year effects. GoodRet(t+1) is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the stock’s next year’s market adjusted return  is greater than zero else equal to zero. 
GoodRoA(t+1) is an indicator variable equal to one if next year’s change in ROA is greater than zero else 
equals to zero. GoodRoAt is an indicator variable equal to one if the current year’s change in ROA is 
greater than zero else equals to zero. BM1t to BM4t is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the book-to-market 
ratio is in the i’th quintile of year t’s book-to-market distribution. HRett and Mrett is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if the market adjusted stock return is in the high trecile and middle trecile respectively of year t’s 
distribution of realized market adjusted returns. InsiderRett is the Modified Dietz return on the portfolio of 
the firm’s shares held by all insiders (director and officers) computed over year t; it is our measure of 
insider trading returns. LossDummyt is an indicator which equals one if InsiderRett is negative and zero if 
positive. (InsiderRet X Loss)t is an interaction variable between InsiderRett and LossDummyt. The sample 
period is 1986-2012 and  the insider trading returns variable, InsiderRett is winsorized at 1% on each tail. 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Panel A: Fama-MacBeth Regressions 
  
  
Dependent variable = PRt 
Hypotheses Variables 
      
  
  
[1] [2] [3] 
Intercept 0.6383*** 0.6005*** 0.6143*** 
Superior Information GoodRet(t+1) (+) 0.0056 0.012 0.0032 
GoodRoA(t+1) (+) 0.0320*** 0.0366** 0.0330*** 
GoodRoAt (+) -0.0114 -0.014 -0.0066 
Undervaluation BM1t (-) -0.2620*** -0.2289*** -0.2764*** 
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BM2t (-) -0.2681*** -0.2560*** -0.2790*** 
BM3t (-) -0.1911*** -0.1446*** -0.1978*** 
BM4t (-) -0.1014*** -0.0665 -0.1196*** 
HRett (-) -0.0775*** -0.0864*** -0.0655*** 
MRett (-) -0.0539*** -0.0424** -0.0505*** 
InsiderRett 0.0021*** 0.0002 
LossDummy 0.0248** 
Loss Aversion (InsiderRet X Loss)t   0.0054*** 
 
Panel B: Firm Fixed Effects Regressions 
  
  
Dependent variable = PRt 
Hypotheses Variables 
      
  
  
[1] [2] [3] 
Superior Information Intercept 0.0367*** 0.0358*** 0.0352*** 
GoodRet(t+1) (+) 0.0386*** 0.0384*** 0.0400*** 
GoodRoA(t+1) (+) 0.0005 0.0002 0.0012 
Undervaluation GoodRoAt (+) -0.2716*** -0.2768*** -0.2682*** 
BM1t (-) -0.2249*** -0.2294*** -0.2239*** 
BM2t (-) -0.1539*** -0.1550*** -0.1520*** 
BM3t (-) -0.0805*** -0.0806*** -0.0793*** 
BM4t (-) -0.0497*** -0.0520*** -0.0395*** 
HRett (-) -0.0363*** -0.0377*** -0.0331*** 
MRett (-) 
 
0.0012*** -0.0002 
InsiderRett 
 
0.0247*** 
Loss Aversion (InsiderRet X Loss)t   0.0044*** 
Firm effects 
 
Included Included Included 
Year effects   Included Included Included 
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Table 5 
The Relation between Insider Purchase Ratios and Insider Returns – Officers versus 
Directors  
This table presents multivariate regressions to compare the loss aversion of directors versus officers with 
respect to purchase ratios. The dependent variable is PRt is the purchase ratio of officers-only in models 1 
and 3; and directors-only in models 2 and 4 in year t,. Panel A uses Fama-MacBeth regressions where the 
model is estimated annually and the average annual coefficients are tested against the null of zero using 
standard errors from the empirically derived distribution of the annual coefficients. Average coefficients 
are presented in panel A. Panel B employs fixed effects regressions with firm and year effects. GoodRet(t+1) 
is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the stock’s next year’s market adjusted return  is greater than zero else 
equal to zero. GoodRoA(t+1) is an indicator variable equal to one if next year’s change in ROA is greater 
than zero else equals to zero. GoodRoAt is an indicator variable equal to one if the current year’s change in 
ROA is greater than zero else equals to zero. BM1t to BM4t is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the book-
to-market ratio is in the i’th quintile of year t’s book-to-market distribution. HRett and Mrett is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the market adjusted stock return is in the high trecile and middle trecile respectively of 
year t’s distribution of realized market adjusted returns. OfficersRett and DirectorRett are the Modified 
Dietz returns on the portfolio of the firm’s shares held by officers-only and directors only respectively 
computed over year t; they are our measures of officer-only and director only trading returns respectively. 
OfficersLossDummyt and DirectorsLossDummyt are indicators which equals one if OfficersRett and 
DirectorsRett are negative and zero if positive, respectively. (OfficersRet X Loss)t .and (DirectorRet X 
Loss)t are interaction variables between  OfficersRett and OfficersLossDummyt; and DirectorsRett and 
DirectorsLossDummyt respectively The sample period is 1986-2012. OfficersRett, and DirectorsRett are 
winsorized at 1% on each tail. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively.  
Panel A: Fama-MacBeth Regressions 
  
  
Dependent variable = PRt 
Hypotheses Variables 
      
  
  
  
[1] [2] [3] [4] 
Intercept 0.6375*** 0.6732*** 0.6300*** 0.6485*** 
Superior 
Information GoodRet(t+1) (+) -0.0029 0.0081238 -0.0044 0.0074274 
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GoodRoA(t+1) (+) 0.0354*** 0.0222*** 0.0362*** 0.0247*** 
GoodRoAt (+) -0.0117 -0.0136258 -0.0098 -0.0125439 
BM1t (-) -0.3291*** -0.2494*** -0.3182*** -0.2377*** 
Undervaluation BM2t (-) -0.3276*** -0.2567*** -0.3189*** -0.2478*** 
BM3t (-) -0.2443*** -0.1584*** -0.2404*** -0.1540*** 
BM4t (-) -0.1389*** -0.0987*** -0.1370*** -0.0976*** 
HRett (-) -0.0736*** -0.0898*** -0.0582*** -0.0618*** 
MRett (-) -0.0657*** -0.0447** -0.0592*** -0.0328v* 
Loss Aversion OfficersRett 0.0022*** 0.0002 
OfficersLossDummyt 0.0277*** 
(OfficersRet X Loss)t 0.0079*** 
DirectorsRett 0.0022*** -0.0007*** 
DirectorsLossDummyt 0.0541*** 
  (DirectorsRet X Loss)t 
 
0.0107*** 
Panel B: Firm Fixed Effects Regressions 
  
  
Dependent variable = PRt 
Hypotheses Variables 
      
  
  
  
[1] [2] [3] [4] 
Superior 
Information GoodRet(t+1) (+) 0.0329*** 0.0313*** 0.0318*** 0.0304*** 
GoodRoA(t+1) (+) 0.0445*** 0.0246*** 0.0451*** 0.0267*** 
GoodRoAt (+) 0.0003 -0.0039 0.001 -0.0031*** 
BM1t (-) -0.2919*** -0.2597*** -0.2829*** -0.2433*** 
Undervaluation BM2t (-) -0.2422*** -0.2198*** -0.2378*** -0.2089*** 
BM3t (-) -0.1725*** -0.1349*** -0.1699*** -0.1289*** 
BM4t (-) -0.0914*** -0.0722*** -0.0904*** -0.0688*** 
HRett (-) -0.0469*** -0.0623*** -0.0356*** -0.0381*** 
MRett (-) -0.0345*** -0.0400*** -0.0303*** -0.0295*** 
Loss Aversion OfficersRett 0.0015*** -0.00004 
LossDummyt 
 
0.0191*** 
(OfficersRet X 
Loss)t  0.0052*** 
DirectorsRett 0.0015*** -0.0008*** 
LossDummyt 0.0516*** 
  
(DirectorsRet X 
Loss)t 0.0087*** 
Firm effects Included Included Included Included 
Year effects Included Included Included Included 
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Table 6 
The Relation between Insider Returns and the Decision to Purchase 
This table presents firm fixed effects logit regressions to assess the relation between insider trading returns 
and insiders’ decisions to purchase shares. The dependent variable is Purchasei,t is an indicator variable that 
equals one if shares are purchased in year t else it is equal to zero. GoodRet(t+1) is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if the stock’s next year’s market adjusted return  is greater than zero else equal to zero. 
GoodRoA(t+1) is an indicator variable equal to one if next year’s change in ROA is greater than zero else 
equals to zero. GoodRoAt is an indicator variable equal to one if the current year’s change in ROA is 
greater than zero else equals to zero. BM1t to BM4t is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the book-to-market 
ratio is in the i’th quintile of year t’s book-to-market distribution. HRett and Mrett is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if the market adjusted stock return is in the high trecile and middle trecile respectively of year t’s 
distribution of realized market adjusted returns. InsiderRett is the Modified Dietz return on the portfolio of 
the firm’s shares held by all insiders (director and officers) computed over year t; it is our measure of 
insider trading returns. LossDummyt is an indicator which equals one if InsiderRett is negative and zero if 
positive. (InsiderRet X Loss)t is an interaction variable between InsiderRett and LossDummyt. The sample 
period is 1986-2012 and the insider trading returns variable, InsiderRett is winsorized at 1% on each tail. 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
    Dependent Variable = Purchasei,t 
Hypotheses Variables       
    [1] [2] [3] 
Superior Information GoodRet(t+1) (+) 0.1338*** 0.1349*** 0.1335*** 
GoodRoA(t+1) (+) 0.1666*** 0.1651*** 0.1670*** 
GoodRoAt (+) 0.0158 0.0154 0.0156 
Undervaluation BM1t (-) -0.8829*** -0.8807*** -0.8796*** 
BM2t (-) -0.7520*** -0.7485*** -0.7478*** 
BM3t (-) -0.5167*** -0.5214*** -0.5208*** 
BM4t (-) -0.2689*** -0.2712*** -0.2699*** 
HRett (-) -0.3819*** -0.3838*** -0.3937*** 
MRett (-) -0.2529*** -0.2561*** -0.2633*** 
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InsiderRett 0.00533*** 0.00268*** 
LossDummy -0.0825*** 
Loss Aversion (InsiderRet X Loss)t   0.00469*** 
Firm effects 
 
Included Included Included 
Year effects   Included Included Included 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 
Economic Impact of Loss Aversion - Being Loss Averse and Acting upon it versus Being 
Loss Averse and ignoring it 
This table examines the economic impact of loss aversion on the wealth of insiders by identifying a 
subsample of insiders who have losses and are predicted not to purchase due to loss aversion. Then splitting 
this subsample into a group that acts upon their loss aversion by not purchasing and a second group that are 
supposedly loss averse but decide to ignore their loss aversion by purchasing and comparing their returns. 
InsiderRett is the Modified Dietz return on the portfolio of the firm’s shares held by all insiders (director 
and officers) computed over year t; it is our measure of insider trading returns. MarketAdjStockRet(t+1) is 
next year’s market-adjusted stock return measured as the firm’s 12-month cumulative return in year t+1 
minus the corresponding12-month return on the valued weighted index; it is a measure of the firm’s future 
performance and measures insiders’ potential gain from trading the firm’s stock as opposed to the market 
portfolio. 
  Mean Value 
T-test for 
differences 
Variable Group 1: No Insider Purchase Group2:Insider Purchase 
of means (p-
value) 
InsiderRett -10.0501 -6.7995 0.0313 
MarketAdjStockRet(t+1) -0.0570 0.0814 0.0526 
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Table 8 
Economic Impact of Loss Aversion - Firm Specific Loss Aversion Coefficients and Insider 
Market Timing Ability  
This table examines the economic impact of loss aversion on the wealth of insiders by using a mixed 
logistic model to get firm specific loss aversion coefficients and forming quartiles based on these 
coefficients to test insider market timing ability across loss sensitivity quartiles. The first quartile has the 
least loss averse insiders and the fourth quartile has the most lost averse insiders. InsiderRett is the 
Modified Dietz return on the portfolio of the firm’s shares held by all insiders (director and officers) 
computed over year t; and approximates the dollar weighted return.. AnnualRett year t’s stock return 
measured as the firm’s 12-month cumulative return in year t; it measures the time weighted return. 
Quartiles Mean value of InsiderRett minus AnnualRett 
1 1.99% 
2 3.75% 
3 4.63% 
4 -0.82% 
 
 
 
